

European Union CP---NDCA Novice Packet

Notes

What is the EU CP?

The EU CP, or European Union counterplan, is a counterplan that mandates that the United States work with the European Union (EU) instead of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This cooperation is supposed to resolve the same problems that the affirmative's case is trying to solve.

The United States and the EU commonly work together on global issues such as climate, security, trade, and other international-stage challenges. However, the Trump administration's push towards isolationism hurt the relationship between the US and the EU.

Many of the cards in this file reference the Trump administration's economic policies that affected the EU, like tariffs. Tariffs are taxes imposed on imported goods that make them more expensive and less desirable to the consumer. The Biden administration is trying to improve the US-EU relationship, but the authors and reporters writing the evidence in this file disagree over whether that will be enough to heal the damage that Trump's policies did.

What are the net benefits to the EU CP?

The reason why the CP is different from all the plans that will be read this year is because instead of working with NATO, the CP has the US work with the EU. Net benefits to counterplans are usually based off of this difference between the plan and the CP. Therefore, any argument that says that working with NATO would be bad because NATO is the problem would work with this CP!

When figuring out if an argument is the net benefit to the EU CP, pay close attention to the reasons, or warrants, why an argument says working with NATO is bad. Sometimes, the argument may have the same claim, i.e. working with NATO is bad, but not for the same reasons. For example, saying that working with NATO is bad because *working with other countries* is bad is **not** a net benefit to this counterplan because this CP still works with other countries! In conclusion, make sure that

Additionally, there is another net benefit included in this file. The net benefit says that when China gains dominance over global emerging technology, that is bad, and the EU is key to stop that. You may hear folks call net-benefits that are related to the CP's way of doing things rather than the aff's case "internal net benefits". If you would like a more in-depth review of the concepts briefly outlined here, please view the accompanying lesson materials

How should I write the CP text for this file?

There is a guide on how to do this included in the “General” 1NC. There are also texts for each packet affirmative in the 1NCs below. You should replace “North Atlantic Treaty Organization” in the plan text with “European Union”, then read it at the beginning of the CP in the 1NC.

Is there anything else I should know about this file?

This file needs to be supplemented with highlighting and block-writing. You should not walk into a round and open up this file for the first time! On the neg, write extensions of the 1NC evidence, explanations of how the CP solves the case and the net-benefit, the net benefit itself, and answers to common arguments like permutations. On the aff, you should create 2AC blocks using the accompanying lessons. Make sure that the cards you are reading apply the most to your specific affirmative! Each section in this file is sorted to help you navigate which cards apply to which specific arguments.

Shell

1NC CP – Ethical AI

Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the European Union on ethical principles to ensure human control in autonomous weapons systems using artificial intelligence.

US-EU AI governance avoids AI harms and promotes AI best practice

Alex **Engler 22**, Brookings Government Fellow, “The EU and U.S. are starting to align on AI regulation,” Brookings, 2-1-2022, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/02/01/the-eu-and-u-s-are-starting-to-align-on-ai-regulation/>, Web 6/30/22

A range of **regulatory changes** and **new hires from the Biden administration** signals a more proactive stance by the federal government towards artificial intelligence (**AI**) **regulation**, which brings the U.S. **closer to that of the European Union (EU)**. These developments are promising, as is **the inclusion of AI issues** in the new EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC). But there are other steps that these leading democracies can take to build alignment on curtailing AI harms

Since 2017, at least 60 countries have adopted some form of artificial intelligence policy, a torrent of activity that nearly matches the pace of modern AI adoption. The expansion of AI governance raises concerns about **looming challenges for international cooperation**. That is, the increasing ubiquity of AI in online services and physical devices means that any new regulations will have important ramifications for global markets. The variety of different ways that AI can be trained and deployed also complicates this picture. For example, AI systems may be hosted in the cloud and accessed remotely from anywhere with an internet connection. **Retraining** and **transfer learning** enable different teams to jointly develop an AI model with many datasets while working out of multiple countries. Edge and federated machine learning techniques enable physical products around the world to share data that affects the function of their AI models.

These considerations complicate AI governance, although they should not be used as an excuse to eschew necessary protections—the many arguments for which I will not repeat here. An ideal outcome would be the implementation of **meaningful governmental oversight of AI**, while also enabling these global AI supply chains. Further, a **more unified international approach** to AI governance could strengthen common oversight, guide research to shared challenges, and promote the sharing of best practices, code, and data.

1NC CP – Vaccines

Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the European Union in the area of biotechnology by increasing vaccine diplomacy and distribution.

US-EU vaccine diplomacy solves – COVID proves.

Josep **Borrell 21**, High Representative, Vice President, *they are not cited as an author on the webpage but they issue the statements of the EEAS*, 6-14-2021, , "Joint EU-US action in the global fight against COVID-19 and towards a sustainable recovery," European Union External Action, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-eu-us-action-global-fight-against-covid-19-and-towards-sustainable-recovery_en Web 6/14/22

The European Union and the United States are joining forces to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic through vaccine development, supply chain collaboration, and medical device production. Building on the EU's climate leadership and the US return to the Paris Agreement, **transatlantic collaboration is driving forward a global recovery.**

EU-US response to COVID-19

Strong transatlantic action is key in addressing global challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic. In collaboration with the World Health Organization and following the G20 Global Health Summit, the EU and the US are distributing and administering vaccines in countries with little or no production of vaccines and scarce resources.

The European COVID-19 Data Platform is key in combatting the virus and detecting global health threats, and three vaccines that have reached millions beyond the EU were created based on EU-US collaboration on both the production and distribution phases. Team Europe aims at donating 100 million doses of vaccines to low and middle-income countries until the end of the year, in particular through the COVAX Facility.

Transatlantic cooperation extends to all those actions needed to improve global preparedness, early warning, prevention, detection, coordinated response, resilience to, and recovery from the current pandemic and future potential public health emergencies.

1NC CP – Cyber Article 5

Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the European Union over international cyber threats.

EU cyber diplomacy solves

Noyan 21 [Oliver, Journalist at Euractiv. "European Parliament calls for increased EU cybersecurity capacity". euractiv. 7-10-2021. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/cybersecurity/news/european-parliament-calls-for-increased-eu-cybersecurity-capacity/>]

Hybrid Threats and Collective Defence

The report also said that the EU is increasingly involved in “hybrid conflicts with its adversaries,” notably China, North Korea, and Russia.

“The picture could not be any clearer, for state actors’ hostile to the EU, like Russia, the cost for attacks is infinitely smaller than the rewards, and that has to change,” centrist MEP Barry Andrews said.

Parliament considered these hybrid conflicts to be particularly dangerous and destabilising for democracies, as they blur the line between war and peace through cyber-enabled disinformation campaigns or targeting digital service providers and critical infrastructure.

However, **these attacks are not severe enough to trigger the collective defence clauses under Article 5 of the NATO treaty or the defence and solidarity clauses under the treaties of the EU.**

To tackle this legal vacuum, the parliamentary report stressed that the provisions for collective defence in the EU treaties should be reinterpreted to allow for voluntary collective countermeasures.

“This is the only effective means to counter the paralysis in reacting to hybrid threats,” the report reads.

Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox

The EU already has several tools at its disposal to respond to cyber-attacks, most notably the cyber diplomacy toolbox.

In her response to the plenary debate, Commissioner Jutta Urpilainen explicitly referred to the toolbox as **one of the primary means to tackle cyber threats and deter attacks by other actors.**

“We work to enhance the EU’s ability to prevent, deter and respond to cyber-attacks, through our **cyber security toolbox, including sanctions,**” Urpilainen said.

The toolbox adopted in 2017 allows the EU to take restrictive measures in response to malicious cyber activities and impose sanctions.

The EU used the toolbox for the first time in 2020 and has imposed sanctions on eight individuals and four entities.

“The European Union cyber diplomacy toolbox has already proved its value in allowing member states to take measures – including sanctions – to address cyber activities affecting them and threatening their security,” Urpilainen said.

1NC INB – China Tech Dominance

US and EU cooperation independently prevents Chinese tech dominance

Robert **Atkinson 21**, President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, “Boosting Transatlantic Technology Cooperation,” The Globalist, 11-29-21,
<https://www.theglobalist.com/boosting-transatlantic-technology-cooperation/> Web 7/1/22

Today, in what could become a second Cold War, this time with China, the U.S. and Europe need to put great emphasis on cooperating economically. The reason for this is straightforward: From the vantage point of each of the transatlantic partners, China poses a threat to our economic competitiveness.

More transatlantic technology cooperation needed

As such, it is incumbent upon the U.S. and the EU to build upon the initial steps of the new US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The goal must be, first, **to reduce economic tensions between the two regions** and second, **to foster formal cooperation.** This is especially true with regard to supporting advanced and emerging technology development and production.

China: Unfair, state-directed capitalism

As Barry Naughton notes in The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy: 1978 to 2020, China has not only become the world’s manufacturing workshop. It is also seeking to be the world leader in emerging technologies such as biotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence and others. What’s more, **China is not only seeking absolute advantage on a host of technologies. It is seeking that advantage largely through unfair, state-directed capitalism.** To be sure, both the EU and the United States have industrial policies – but these policies mostly support foundational elements like workforce training, infrastructure and R&D.

China looking for dominance

In contrast, China’s predatory regime, especially subsidies to industry, goes way beyond what is considered acceptable industrial policy. On top of that, the Chinese Communist Party compels technology transfer for market access, encourages intellectual property theft and operates tax and regulatory policies that discriminate against EU and U.S. firms. That, combined with real strengths of the Chinese economy – a massive domestic market that lures in foreign investment, a massive technical and scientific labor force and improving research universities – mean that China is gaining rapidly technologically.

At the expense of EU and U.S.

That gain has and will come at the expense of the EU’s and U.S.’s global market shares in advanced technologies. The result of that shift cannot be underestimated. Initially, China systematically assembled the components needed to be the manufacturing workshop of the world. This systematic approach has made it hard, even with the Trump tariffs and measures by Japan and other countries, to move production out of China.

Chinese tech supremacy causes nuclear war.

Matthew **Kroenig 18**, Deputy Director for Strategy at Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?”, The Bulletin, 11-21-18, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war/>, Web 7/5/22

International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they **undermine effective bargaining**. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage.

You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power.

For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine.

Moreover, **China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future** of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, **quantum computing, 5G** wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.”

If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war.

If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a **newfound, local military advantage over the United States**, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member.

Either scenario could bring these **nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States**, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation.

This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly.

When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to **maintain an innovation edge**. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states.

These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington **losing the race for technological superiority** to its autocratic challengers **just might mean nuclear Armageddon.**

Neg – Solvency

Solvency---General---2NC

Cooperation with the European Union reinvigorates a strong trans-atlantic partnership and counters Chinese tech leadership

Erica D. **Borghard 20**, Senior fellow with the New American Engagement Center at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council., 12-9-2020, "Emerging Technology and a Reimagined U.S.-EU Partnership," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/emerging-technology-and-reimagined-us-eu-partnership>, Web 6/30/22

This week, the Financial Times reported that the European Commission and the European Union's (EU) high representative for foreign policy will issue a paper proposing a reimagined partnership between the EU and the United States to address a range of shared challenges, especially those posed by China. This proposal echoes similar discussions about the merits of a partnership of "techno-democracies," as well as efforts spearheaded by the United Kingdom to build a D-10 alliance of democracies. This EU initiative reportedly spans a wide range of topics, such as technology, trade, and COVID-19 policy. There are significant gaps to be bridged on a number of fronts, especially data privacy [PDF] laws and regulation of private sector technology companies. Nonetheless, this is welcome news—with some caveats.

This proposal contains a number of positive elements. First, a European-driven effort to revive the transatlantic partnership is a seemingly unintended consequence of the Trump administration's trade wars, which included the imposition of tariffs against EU members, and its "America first" approach to diplomacy. Fear among some in Washington that the Trump administration's actions would indelibly damage American ties with European allies appear to have been misplaced. However, a critical task facing the incoming Biden administration will be to discern how to work with European partners to reimagine the transatlantic relationship in light of changes in the strategic context, such as uncertainty about the role of America in the world after the Trump administration and changes in how Europe perceives the challenge posed by China.

Second, the EU initiative appropriately frames the crux of great power competition in economic rather than military terms, with emerging technology playing an essential role. Efforts by China and Russia to craft alternative international institutions, exert leadership in existing ones, or form new agreements without the United States, have primarily taken place in the economic and technology realms. Even a cursory examination illuminates this trend—the recent signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand; China and Russia's efforts to create alternatives to the SWIFT financial messaging system; or China's efforts to promote new international telecommunications standards for 5G. It's fitting, therefore, that the EU has proposed this new partnership. Typically, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is seen as the bedrock of the transatlantic alliance, and members states certainly confront shared threats in the area of emerging technology. But, as a military alliance, NATO is not well-suited to address these types of challenges. This hopefully reflects a shared transatlantic understanding that economic statecraft will be prominently featured in grand strategies for great power competition.

That said, there are also areas for concern. This proposal appears to comprise a diverse set of issues that will be difficult to resolve under one umbrella. Even for technology, the EU paper proposes a number of initiatives, including digital regulation, anti-trust, limiting foreign investment, and addressing cyber

threats. This creates the risk that, in aiming to get everything done, nothing will get done, especially when there could be competing priorities and interests across issues. The reality is that not every emerging technology issue should be tackled by a U.S.-EU partnership. For instance, it would be wise for the United States to distinguish between primarily national security and intelligence issues, such as cyber threats, which would be better addressed through existing military (NATO) and intelligence (Five Eyes) alliances, versus economic ones (such as antitrust regulation).

Transatlantic research is targeted and effective---previous research relationships prove

Richard L. **Hudson 21**, et al. Nicholas Wallace, Journalists, “US and EU look for ways to boost American participation in Horizon Europe R&D,” Science|Business, 6-17-2021, <https://sciencebusiness.net/technology-strategy-board/news/us-and-eu-look-ways-boost-american-participation-horizon-europe-rd>

The big picture, Web 6/17/22

In a sense, the whole issue has been a distraction from the main story of transatlantic science: big, broad and effective. “**The US is our most successful and active partner**” in research, said Child.

For years, US research agencies have been inking bilateral deals with British, German, French and other European counterparts to co-fund projects or coordinate their calls for research proposals. Indeed, the stunning success of COVID-19 research is partly due to these deep transatlantic ties. EU programmes amount to less than 10% of total European research funding, and a lot of the key pandemic alliances were US-German or US-UK rather than between Washington and Brussels. And even in EU programmes, there have long been some specific areas – chiefly ocean and health research – in which the two governments have managed to organise targeted collaborations

But the big prize for US universities would be finding a regular route to EU collaboration – one that didn’t agitate their lawyers over the contractual terms. Based on the progress so far, some US universities are already planning research proposals with European colleagues. Unlike the UK, the US is considered unlikely ever to join Horizon as a full member – but short of that, there’s lots of room for increased collaboration.

Urbanas said, “We’re looking at the changes [in the EU’s Horizon plans] and we find them welcome - and we’ll go from there

The EU’s research network solves by promoting diverse research perspectives

Zoe **Stanley-Lockman 21**, Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, “Emerging AI governance for international security: The stakes and stakeholders of responsibility,” Azure Forum, 3-10-2021, <https://www.azureforum.org/the-azure-forum-strategic-insights/emerging-ai-governance-for-international-security-the-stakes-and-stakeholders-of-responsibility/>, Web 6/25/22

Which stakeholders?

The distribution of risk across a technology’s lifecycle is no small challenge because it requires looping in the host of stakeholders involved in – and responsible for – each aspect of the technology’s design,

development, diffusion, and deployment. Stakeholders like international organisations, states, and the European Union are already mentioned above. Yet, to meet the wide-ranging risks, anticipatory governance requires upstream involvement from other relevant entities such as the private sector, civil society, academia, and more nebulously defined research networks or communities of practice. Given the rate at which technologies converge to culminate in new inventions, no single individual or entity can single-handedly manage risk and shape the trajectory of innovation to the benefit of humanity.

This means that to conduct responsible innovation – also called responsible research and innovation (RRI) in EU nomenclature), anticipatory, deliberative, and responsive governance can only be achieved by including these diverse perspectives with unique responsibilities. This inclusivity of many stakeholders is also deemed necessary to make sure that social and cultural aspects are considered on top of technical ones. Responsible innovation not only entails safety and security – it goes further to consider moral obligations that are embedded in hard and soft law, and in human activity to help keep the focus on impact and outcomes, rather than inputs.

In practice, this requires a change in paradigm from one of liability to a broader emphasis on accountability and responsibility. In addition to the aforementioned ongoing attempts of the European Commission to marry these concepts, interested parties may look toward other organisations that have deep experience working with safety-critical and high-risk systems. At the national level, democratic governments, including their armed forces, are situated to take on these responsibilities given that they are structured to adhere to strict legal processes and reduce risks. For example, Australian defence researchers and ethicists recently offered practical tools to manage ethical risks, including a checklist, risk matrix, and a more formal documentation program for high-risk AI systems. Such documentation practices, which require different parties to register their involvement in the system across its lifecycle, could apply equally to civilian or defence processes.

Conclusion

A number of middle powers and small states have increased their interest in shaping the international technology order, seeking to play an outsized role in international technology governance. In the past, coalitions of small states and civil society organisations have proven decisive in disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives. Ireland, for instance, was part of the “core group” of the Ottawa Process that led to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. For such core groups to establish the rules of the international technology order today, facilitating governance changes to responsible innovation may be key, while managing technological risks affecting human rights and power dynamics in the international system are equally relevant.

It is not new to focus technology management on practices such as norms, standards, and regulations. But the interrelationships between governments and other crucial governance actors – in the private, public, academic, and civil society sectors – will be important to shape innovation in alignment with core values. Weaving together coherent governance regimes whereby actors understand their responsibilities in mitigating risk is important to preventing negative consequences across the technology lifecycle. What is more, in this modern-day competitive international system, the earlier that attempts to shape the international technology order take place, the greater the opportunity to create democratic accountability.

Solvency---General---Security Cooperation

Collaboration with the EU solves Russia security relations---currently, they assume that EU security policies are part of NATO's enlargement scheme

Hugo **Klijn 11**, Senior research fellow at the Security and Conflict Programme of the Institute for International Relations 'Clingendael' in The Hague, "Chapter 15, Europe's Virtual Security Debate and a New Transatlantic Relationship", NATO's Retirement? Essays in Honour of Peter Volten, <https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/334997151.pdf>, Web 6/21/22

Third Parties

Last but not least, **a new transatlantic partnership** more firmly based on both participants' autonomy would **enable the EU**, but also the USA, to review their relations with third parties. Take, for example, Russia. Among other reasons, **the EU-Russia relationship**, important because of the density of trade, investment and energy links but marred by endless negotiations on a new strategic agreement, **is held back because of Moscow's frustration** that it cannot discuss security with the EU, which tends **to refer to NATO** instead. As long as Europe labels NATO as its primary security organization, **Moscow is likely to regard the EU's neighbourhood policies as affiliated with the alliance's enlargement agenda**, given the expressed synergies between these two 'EuroAtlantic organizations'. More broadly speaking, the outside world will look at Europe as a more serious interlocutor as it depends less on US security guarantees. Sticking to the Russia example, the US, lacking the economic dimension in its relationship with Moscow, is perfectly capable of concluding deals on strategic issues, such as the recent START agreement on nuclear arsenals. But many, not all, of the bilateral irritants concern Europe and are NATO related. It is probably no coincidence that Russian compliance with START has been made dependent on missile defence developments in Europe.

Solvency---AI

AI oversight by multiple governments helps avoid the worst harms

Alex Engler 22, Brookings Government Fellow, “The EU and U.S. are starting to align on AI regulation,” Brookings, 2-1-2022, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/02/01/the-eu-and-u-s-are-starting-to-align-on-ai-regulation/>, Web 6/30/22

The expertise of staff joining the Biden administration also signals greater prominence for these issues—especially AI Now Institute co-founder Meredith Whittaker at the FTC, as well as AI harms experts Suresh Venkatasubramanian and Rashida Richardson at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). To advance its call for an AI Bill of Rights from its leadership, OSTP has also started a public event series on biometric technologies and other hazardous AI. All told, **these developments suggest that the Biden administration’s outlook is closer to the EU’s AI oversight goals than many seem to realize.**

This trend is not just limited to AI products and services. The Senate’s recent introduction of the Platform Accountability and Transparency Act suggests the potential for more U.S.-EU consensus. Proposed legislation would enable university researchers to work with raw platform data, subject to approval by the National Science Foundation and with corporate compliance enforced by a new FTC office. This mirrors a core provision of the EU’s proposed Digital Services Act, whose passage by the European Parliament seems increasingly likely.

Also relevant, though less specific to AI, is the July 2021 Biden executive order aimed at increasing competition in US markets, which contains many tech-focused provisions. This order, along with the selection of Lina Khan to lead the FTC, convinced EU competition chief Margrethe Vestager that there is a “lot of alignment” between the two governments.

Getting Proactive On Regulatory Cooperation

The emerging policy landscapes on both sides of the Atlantic reflect progress towards a **significant governmental role** in protecting citizens from AI harms. Yet this shared ambition does not make consistent regulations especially likely. For context, a 2009 analysis documented thousands of instances of regulatory divergence and non-tariff barriers to trade between the EU and U.S. That the ensuing efforts to bring these policies into alignment have gone quite poorly suggests that preventing the incoherence might be the best approach. AI regulations, which are likely to include many technical definitions even specific mathematical formulas, are certain to offer many opportunities for honest disagreement.

Beyond circumventing barriers to trade, consistent approaches may also strengthen government oversight. **Enforcement of similar AI regulations by multiple governments can increase the odds that the worst offenses**, at least by international businesses, are caught. Further, **consistent governmental priorities send a clear signal to the civil society and academic communities** in the EU and the U.S., directing investigations and research to shared concerns.

AI cooperation avoids disputes and both the US and the EU have a commitment responsible AI development

Gregory **Arcuri 22**, Research Intern with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, “How Is the U.S. Cooperating with Its European Allies on Issues of Technology?,” CSIS, 4-5-2022, <https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/how-us-cooperating-its-european-allies-issues-technology>

Promising Signs for Enhanced Cooperation, Web 6/22/22

Optimism for meaningful cooperation, though, is still warranted. The **TTC is the most promising forum for technology and innovation collaboration** in recent memory. Launched in June 2021, the TTC’s explicit goal is “to lead global, like-minded [democratic] partners in promoting an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable digital space, and to remain leaders in developing and protecting tomorrow’s technology.”

Importantly, the Council’s **agenda intentionally avoids topics of long-standing disagreement and tension between the U.S. and Europe** (so-called “iron rice bowls”) which have doomed previous forums for negotiation, such as agricultural subsidies, the Boeing-Airbus dispute, and Trump-era steel and aluminum tariffs.

The Council established ten working groups to **promote high-level dialogue** on a variety of issues where collaboration appears possible, including:

Technology standards, Climate and green technology, Secure supply chains, Information and communications technology and services security and competitiveness, Data governance and tech platform regulation, Misuse of technology threatening security and human rights, Export controls, Investment screening, Promoting access to and use of digital technologies among small and medium enterprises, Global trade challenges

The Council’s first meeting in September 2021 led to a series of notable outcomes on issues where significant agreement already exists. For example, on the issue of the global semiconductor shortage, both sides are committed to “identify[ing] gaps in the semiconductor value chain” and enhancing their respective semiconductor ecosystems. The U.S. and Europe have already begun **taking important steps towards this shared goal**. Of note, the European Commission has drafted legislation to mobilize over €43 billion in public and private funds to double its share of the global semiconductor manufacturing market by 2030. Meanwhile, in the United States, lawmakers continue to debate the CHIPS for America Act and the FABS Act, which provide lump-sum and tax-based incentives for chip manufacturers to “onshore” their operations. While these appear to be self-serving initiatives, the two sides view them as critical to ensuring mutual resiliency in a critical strategic industry.

In artificial intelligence (AI), **the U.S. and E.U. affirmed** their commitment to **responsibly developing AI** which is used in a way that respects **democratic values and universal human rights**. The European Union has already proposed sweeping legislation, known as the AI Act, which would serve as the first comprehensive law on artificial intelligence use and development worldwide. While the U.S. has no similar legislation making its way through Congress, the White House has established several bilateral initiatives through U.S. embassies and federal agencies with European partners to promote “democracy-affirming technologies” and responsible artificial intelligence and machine learning.

There's extensive engagement on both sides over AI, but the US may take the lead on major issues

Alex **Engler 22**, Brookings Government Fellow, "The EU and U.S. are starting to align on AI regulation," Brookings, 2-1-2022, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/02/01/the-eu-and-u-s-are-starting-to-align-on-ai-regulation/>, Web 6/30/22

The extensive engagement of the EU on these issues likely elevated AI policy into the TTC. Most prominently, this proposed AI Act, which would create regulatory oversight for a wide range of high-risk AI applications in both digital services (e.g., hiring and admissions software) and physical products (e.g., medical devices). The AI Act would affect other types of AI, such as by requiring disclosure of low-risk AI systems and banning a few categories of AI, but these will likely result in fewer international trade and regulatory considerations. Although there is still much uncertainty in how the AI Act rules would be enforced, existing regulatory agencies within EU member states are likely to take on much of the work. Debate on the act's contents is still ongoing; it is also worth noting that, if passed, these new rules could take some time to take effect. Consider the case of General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Recent fines on Amazon (€746 million) and WhatsApp (€225 million) for privacy violations demonstrate the EU's willingness to use its regulatory powers, but most of the significant penalties have come two years after the implementation and four years after the passage of the GDPR. If the AI Act follows a similar timeline, it may be years before significant oversight is in place.

The U.S. Revs the Regulatory Engines

In contrast, gradual U.S. developments have made fewer headlines, but they are aggregating into a meaningful approach to AI regulation. Some agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration or the Department of Transportation, have been working for years to incorporate AI considerations into their regulatory regimes. In late 2020, the Trump Administration's Office of Management and Budget encouraged agencies to consider what regulatory steps might be necessary for AI, although it generally urged a light touch.

Since then, policymaking during the Biden administration signals the pace of change has picked up. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) first published a widely-noted blog post and then started a rulemaking process making it clear that the agency considers issues of AI discrimination, fraud, and related data misuse to be within its purview. Further, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has begun reversing a Trump administration rule that effectively shielded housing-related algorithms from claims of discrimination. In late October, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission announced it would launch an initiative on enforcing hiring and workplace protections on AI systems. Further, five financial regulators have started an inquiry into AI practices in financial institutions that may affect risk management, fair lending, and creditworthiness. Lastly, the National Institute for Standards and Technology is in the process of developing an AI risk management framework. This list of policy interventions is starting to look a bit like the EU's perspective on "high-risk" AI. In fact, given that it could take years from passage for the EU to set up and enforce its AI Act, the U.S. may find itself leading in many practical areas of AI regulation.

Solvency---Biotech---Vaccine Diplomacy

US-EU cooperation solves vaccine diplomacy

Jillian **Deutsch 22**, 7-12-2022, et al. Nick Niedzwiedek, Politico Reporters "EU, US announce 'partnership' on global vaccine distribution effort," POLITICO, <https://www.politico.eu/article/biden-partnership-eu-coronavirus-vaccine-distribution/> Web 7-12-2022

The United States and European Union on Wednesday announced a partnership to further the global COVID-19 vaccination effort by vaccinating 70 percent of the world by next year's U.N. General Assembly.

"The United States is leading the world on vaccination donations. As we're doing that, we need other high-income countries to deliver on their own ambitious vaccine donations and pledges," U.S. President Joe Biden said at a virtual meeting with leaders of the United Nations, World Health Organization and countries including the United Kingdom and Canada.

Biden said the partnership will allow the EU and U.S. "to work more closely together" and that one of its bedrock principals will be committing to "donating, not selling" vaccine doses to less-affluent countries.

The U.S. and EU are calling for all countries that can vaccinate their populations to **double their donation commitments** or make "meaningful contributions to vaccine readiness," the European Commission wrote in a statement.

Both upped their own vaccine contributions. The Commission announced Wednesday the EU would donate 500 million doses "in addition to the doses we have financed through COVAX," the program for equitable global access.

The EU has so far committed to donate 450 million doses by mid-next year. Almost half of that should be shipped by the end of the year, but the bloc is lagging far behind with only 28 million doses shipped so far, according to a document reported by POLITICO on Wednesday.

Biden also made official his administration's plan to **purchase another 500 million vaccine doses to distribute to some of the world's poorest nations.** News of the additional supply trickled out earlier this week, and will bring the U.S.'s total commitment to 1.1 billion doses. The U.S. has delivered less than 150 million doses, according to Unicef.

"Put another way, for every one shot we've administered to date in America, we have now committed to do three shots to the rest of the world," Biden said at the summit.

Biden also pledged that the U.S. will provide an additional \$370 million "to support administering these shots and delivery globally," as well as more than \$380 million to Gavi, the organization overseeing the daily operations for the COVAX vaccination project.

Biden also urged those assembled Wednesday to make sure they follow through on their vaccine commitments.

Out of the 870 million vaccine doses countries pledged to donate at the G7 this summer, only 15 percent have been shipped so far.

Last week Bruce Aylward, the top WHO official working on COVAX, said the world needs 2.4 billion additional doses to go into low-income countries in order for them to get 40 percent of their populations vaccinated by the end of 2021.

Biden also proposed another confab sometime “in the first quarter of 2022” to assess their progress.

The director of Wellcome, Jeremy Farrar, said that the summit was a “very encouraging step forward,” but called for the 70-percent vaccination target within a year to be “our minimum shared ambition.”

“Global leaders must share more vaccines now and set out measurable commitments to timetables outlining exactly when and how vaccines will be delivered,” he said.

Others were less complimentary. Peter Maybarduk, director of Public Citizen’s Access to Medicines program, said that the summit “will not produce the transformative response needed to end the pandemic.”

“Ending the pandemic is a choice. Leaders at today’s summit have yet to make that choice,” said Maybarduk.

Solvency---Biotech---AT: EU Too Restrictive

Regulatory regimes won't be overly-restrictive---the EU is trying to avoid its past mistakes

Val **Giddings 22**, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, "Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation in Biotech Policy—A US Perspective," ITIF, 3-11-2022, <https://itif.org/publications/2022/03/11/prospects-transatlantic-cooperation-biotech-policy-us-perspective>, Web 7/1/22

It is one thing to implement policies and regulations ostensibly designed to ensure safety; it is quite another to ignore vast data and decades of experience around the world to maintain obsolete policies and regulations that add nothing to safety or sustainability.

The European Union decided to regulate **seeds improved through biotechnology** as a novel class governed under new regulations specifically focused on an arbitrary category known as "GMOs" (for "genetically modified organisms"). The conceit was that because they represented gene combinations produced by mechanisms supposedly "not found in nature" (but actually ubiquitous) they must present novel hazards, even though none has ever been identified. These putatively novel hazards, despite the lack of any concrete manifestations, allegedly required dedicated, specific, "**precautionary**" regulations. The resulting **regulatory regime proved so burdensome** it led to the general collapse of agricultural biotechnology in Europe, which had played a leading role in its discovery and invention. Permissions for field trials proved almost impossible to obtain, products could not be developed and brought to market, academic labs abandoned the field, and the industry relocated most of its assets and activities to the Americas. And Europe became the world's **largest importer of commodity foods improved through biotechnology**, only recently surpassed by China.

Opportunity For Transatlantic Cooperation

Many scientists in the EU (and around the world) knew from the beginning that this was the wrong approach, yet the EU pushed its model internationally, with aggressive diplomacy, leading to emulation by many countries in the developing world, with equally unhappy results to those seen in Europe. But a growing number of scientists, policymakers, and even "green" NGOs that had originally opposed GMOs, now recognize the counterproductive results of this approach and are **working to avoid repeating the same mistakes with gene editing**. This shines a spotlight on the most important and potentially fruitful opportunity for transatlantic cooperation in biotechnology: the revival of **science-based regulatory regimes** in which the degree of regulatory oversight is proportional to the hazards involved, and **regulation that enables**, rather than discourages the **safe development of innovative products**. A return to and reaffirmation of these first principles would provide fertile ground for cooperation and coordination globally. Regulatory reform (everywhere, not just in the EU and its emulators, though the need is greatest there) provides fertile ground for **transatlantic cooperation and coordination**. We have robust models of proven approaches.¹² Without such cooperation, other progress in developing and deploying innovative solutions through biotechnology will be impeded or foregone.

As to national security risks, just as with other risks, novelty attributable to biotechnology is elusive. One can do very nasty things with conventional bioweapons, and they are easily magnified with recombinant DNA techniques. At the same time, defensive capacities are also buttressed by biotechnology, as

demonstrated by the rapid development of mRNA vaccines against SARS-CoV-2. There has been some good work done in this area, but this topic is worth **exploring at greater depth.** The OECD has a track record of thoughtful analyses with such topics. One possibility would be to build on that foundation by establishing a joint OECD/NATO working group to serve as a forum.

Solvency---Cyber---Cyberattacks

US and EU action deters cyber attacks

Arthur **Laudrain 22** Fellow at the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative, et al. Arthur de Liedekerke, Project Manager at political advisory Rasmussen Global, "Russia's Cyber War: What's Next and What the European Union Should Do.," Council on Foreign Relations, 3-30-2022, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/russias-cyber-war-whats-next-and-what-european-union-should-do>, Web 6/21/22

Second, the EU and its Member States have a role to play in discouraging and deterring cyberattacks by demonstrating a willingness to act and impose costs on perpetrators. The first-ever operational deployment of the EU's Cyber Rapid Response Team to Ukraine, **alongside similar teams from the United States**, was a welcome signal in this respect. One way to impose further costs would be by pushing for coordinated attribution of cyberattacks at the EU-level. On the offensive and deterrent side, the EU should adopt a pooling of capabilities on a voluntary basis. Similar programs already exist among other groups, such as NATO's Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies (SCEPVA) program, which the EU could use as a model for its own programs.

Third, the EU should ensure it is better prepared by leveraging the tools it already has at its disposal. Intelligence sharing and situational awareness have proven vital before and during the war in Ukraine, but the future effectiveness of these strategies in deterring and mitigating cyberattacks will be reliant on Member States willingness to contribute with timely and actionable intelligence. In the short term, the Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network (CyCLONe), a recently created group bringing together the executives of the EU's twenty seven national cybersecurity authorities, should be used to its full capability and integrated with the rest of the EU cyber ecosystem. CyCLONe, with their wealth of operational-level expertise, should be able to brief political decision-makers in the Council more frequently. On the military side, the EU still lacks a fully fleshed-out cooperation mechanism for military cybersecurity alerts, despite this being an objective since the 2014 EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework. Ensuring cooperation among both civilian and military groups is vital given the specter of Russian cyberattacks.

Supporting Ukraine is every democracy's duty. Russia will attempt to undermine this support through cyberattacks and other means. The EU needs to shore up its cyber defenses at home to ensure all Members can continue to aid Ukraine in the future.

US-EU cyber cooperation is empirically successful

Julia **Schuetze 20**, Author, "EU-US Cybersecurity Policy Coming Together: Recommendations for instruments to accomplish joint strategic goals :: EU Cyber Direct," 11-25-2020, <https://eucyberdirect.eu/research/eu-us-cybersecurity-policy-coming-together-recommendations-for-instruments-to-accomplish-joint-strategic-goals>, 6/23/22

The need for more **US–EU collaboration** on cybersecurity policy has been identified by **policymakers and diplomats from the EU and the US** in their official Cyber Dialogues 2018 and 2019 as well as by **international cybersecurity policy scholars.** As the EU shapes its cybersecurity policies and fosters coordination among member states, cooperation at the EU level becomes more important to the US.

EU–US cooperation to achieve shared policy goals such as prosecution and prevention of cybercrime has already resulted in **implementing policy instruments together** such as a **joint exercise or information-sharing agreement** specifically on **cybercrime**. Nevertheless, on a broader strategic level and with the focus on responses to malicious cyber-activities, concrete steps forward have been difficult to achieve in an environment where the EU and the US grapple with an ever-changing threat landscape that targets their values and ways of life and has made them focus on developing further their own processes and policy approaches in 2018–2020. This paper sets out to find actions that the EU and US can implement together. It takes a practical approach by first identifying joint strategic goals and analysing the commonalities of EU and US cybersecurity policy. This allows a broader perspective on what the EU and US joint strategic goals really are, and what is feasible to do together. It is important to take account of the limitations and divergences that, as many others have pointed out, make cooperation difficult, but this paper uses them more as a means to find which instruments are actually feasible. Anyone who is interested to learn more about the EU and US, as well as those who are looking to find a way forward for transatlantic cooperation, will find glimpses of hope here and there in a policy field where it cannot be denied that the EU and US diverge as much as they converge.

Key takeaways on EU-US cooperation

The intention of closer cooperation between the US and the EU to prevent, detect and react to malicious cyber-activities lacks a clear signal of what the joint strategic goal(s) of closer cooperation are.

Joint strategic goals can be developed by first identifying shared goals and then analysing which shared goals would be better pursued together.

The EU and US should focus on: Assisting each other in improving resilience, Achieving a common understanding of threats and vulnerabilities, Improving cooperation mechanisms among a diverse set of stakeholders, Improving the cybersecurity workforce

AT: No Solvency---Cooperation Fails

US and EU cooperation is growing under Biden---TTC, biotech initiatives, and climate cooperation all prove

Richard L. **Hudson 21**, et al. Nicholas Wallace, Journalists, "US and EU look for ways to boost American participation in Horizon Europe R&D," Science-Business, 6-17-2021, <https://sciencebusiness.net/technology-strategy-board/news/us-and-eu-look-ways-boost-american-participation-horizon-europe-rd>, Web 6/27/22

US and EU officials are exploring ways to boost the participation of **American researchers** in Europe's biggest R&D programme.

Preliminary discussions are underway to develop what an academic source calls "workarounds" to a series of detailed legal issues that have discouraged many US universities from participating in the European research projects. The outcome isn't certain, and officials declined to comment in detail. But at a Science-Business conference on June 15 senior EU and US officials sent out optimistic signals.

"We've been **making some progress** with colleagues in the new administration recently on some of the technical, legal obstacles" to **American participation in EU programmes**, said Patrick Child, deputy director general for research and innovation at the European Commission. Likewise, "very promising" was how Elizabeth Urbanas, the US Energy Department's acting assistant secretary for international affairs, described some technical and legal changes the Commission is planning in its new R&D programme

The talks are the latest stage in a **remarkable rapprochement, since Joe Biden** became President, between Washington and Brussels over science and technology cooperation. Also on June 15, the Biden Administration and the Commission agreed to set up a **Trade and Technology Council, build an alliance on climate-friendly technologies and to look at forming a joint initiative on biotechnology and genomics**. All of this is in sharp contrast to the US isolationism of the Trump years.

"Overall, it's very clear that the **US now wants to partner with Europe**, especially, and the rest of the **world on climate change** – that we don't want to go it alone," said Rep. Don Beyer, a leading Congressional Democrat and chair of the House subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics.

The EU is open to new partners and American cooperation is viewed positively

Richard L. **Hudson 21**, et al. Nicholas Wallace, Journalists, "US and EU look for ways to boost American participation in Horizon Europe R&D," Science|Business, 6-17-2021, <https://sciencebusiness.net/technology-strategy-board/news/us-and-eu-look-ways-boost-american-participation-horizon-europe-rd>, Web 6/12/22

At the same time, the EU is reaching out to research partners across the globe. Also this week, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen publicly invited Canada to join Horizon Europe. Child said the EU had received "a clear expression of interest" from Ottawa. Separately, the EU has had informal soundings on partnerships with Japan, Australia and other global science powers. Action had been held up, however, by the protracted negotiations about the UK leaving the EU (though remaining a Horizon partner). With that settled in December, and a separate internal EU quarrel over foreign research

partnerships temporarily put on hold, the Commission appears to be rushing now to make up for lost time.

Today “the tone seems a lot more positive” in the EU-US discussions than in the past, said an academic source.

More projects to come?

The result could be a gradually rising number of EU projects involving American partners – particularly at US public universities. But most of these deals would involve Americans participating in a project with their own US funding rather, than collecting EU money. That might seem an unattractive prospect. But it’s already fairly common for non-EU researchers, as it can permit them to share in the European results without getting fully enmeshed in the EU grants paperwork. Many transatlantic research teams use the EU connection as a way to strengthen their ongoing research under national funding schemes

Under the EU’s rules, the Commission can provide grants to non-EU researchers under special conditions, for instance, if the foreign team’s knowledge or databases are “essential” for their EU partners to proceed. Indeed, from 2014 to 2020, **Americans received €119.5 million in EU grants; the largest recipient was the University of California.** But it’s far more common for Americans to join as unfunded participants. In the same period, the Commission counted 1,999 American “participations.” And there might have been many more participations were it not for a convoluted series of disagreements over the Commission’s contractual terms.

As Child put it at the Science-Business event: “I think that the European Union and the United States probably have the highest concentration of well-paid lawyers in the world, and when you put those two communities alongside each other with different legal frameworks to play with, you can see that maybe things don’t go as smoothly or as quickly as the politicians would like. But I think that the good news is that **where there is a will, there is generally a way.**”

AT: No Solvency---EU Weak

EU action can sufficiently defense itself

Arthur **Laudrain 22** Fellow at the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative, et al. Arthur de Liedekerke, Project Manager at political advisory Rasmussen Global, "Russia's Cyber War: What's Next and What the European Union Should Do.," Council on Foreign Relations, 3-30-2022, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/russias-cyber-war-whats-next-and-what-european-union-should-do>, Web 6/29/22

Last, but certainly not least, it is worth remembering that we are in the early stages of a war that will drag on, potentially for months, leaving plenty of time for new Russian cyber operations. Apparent reluctance to use cyber capabilities beyond limited operational-level hits or disinformation campaigns may well abate as fears of spillover or retaliatory Western cyber responses diminish. **The European Union (EU) must act now**, while the intensity of cyber conflict outside Ukraine is still relatively low, **to bolster its defenses and prepare for the specter of wide-ranging, damaging cyber operations later in the conflict.**

Even if the Russians agree to a truce, **cyber and disinformation efforts would be one of the few avenues available to them to inflict damage on Ukraine in the gray zone below the threshold of direct confrontation.** As the Russian military shifts its objectives, resources and bandwidth will be freed up to fight from the rear. **A cornered Moscow—with few other options left on the table—is likely to resort to the cyber domain**, as other pariah states have done, as the ideal vector to circumvent isolation, spy on and disrupt Western defense plans, steal technology and intellectual property it will be cut off from, and heighten its global nuisance with disinformation operations. Recent attacks on a major Ukrainian telecommunications firm, Ukrtelecom, have heightened fears that Russia's stalling military campaign could cause it to turn to cyber operations as another means of achieving its aims.

The EU has adopted new frameworks, including its much vaunted Strategic Compass, which, in the long term, will improve cybersecurity in the bloc, and potentially reduce the risk of catastrophic Russian cyberattacks. **However, the EU needs to take more steps in the short term to shore up cyber defenses and mitigate the threat of Russian cyber operations.**

First, **the EU should get its own house in order.** The revised Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive—better known in Brussels circles as NIS 2—should be finalized in the coming months and will **aim to further strengthen the security of supply chains**, streamline incident reporting obligations, **and introduce more stringent supervisory measures for a large number of operators of essential services and enterprises across the EU.** While NIS 2 represents a step in the right direction, **the EU still has some way to go in implementing harmonized cybersecurity rules across the bloc's own institutions.**

Neg – Perm

AT: Perm Do Both---2NC

Cooperation between the US, the EU, and NATO is unsustainable because of conflicting security interests---and, the US is the key player anyhow

Hugo **Klijn 11**, Senior research fellow at the Security and Conflict Programme of the Institute for International Relations 'Clingendael' in The Hague, "Chapter 15, Europe's Virtual Security Debate and a New Transatlantic Relationship", NATO's Retirement? Essays in Honour of Peter Volten, <https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/334997151.pdf>, Web 6/21/22

Of course, it makes sense for countries to ally themselves with the world's foremost power, and only for that reason NATO will continue to exist for some time to come. But increasingly, **the de facto EU-US-NATO triangle is becoming untenable.** On the one hand, sustaining US-led NATO as Europe's primary security forum at the end of the day runs counter to EU ambitions in the field of foreign and security policy. On the other hand it ties Europe to a more global US security agenda that, deep down, **it does not subscribe to and that it is certainly not willing to shoulder financially.** Finally, as long as Europe remains a function of US security policy, this will put a curb on its ability to forge comprehensive partnerships with third parties.

Revamping the Transatlantic Relationship

The transatlantic relationship, North America's partnership with Europe, is still the world's most vital economic, strategic and political bond, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The question is, however, whether NATO should remain its ultimate embodiment, or whether this relationship should be remodelled and based on a broad and new strategic EU-US partnership, including provisions on security and defence such as a mutual assistance clause. Such a recalibrated partnership would leave room for differences in approach and be more informal in nature, while not necessarily always involving all 27 EU members, but still important when crises erupt. We have seen examples of this kind of cooperation on Iran, with the EU3 teaming up with the US, and the Middle East, where the EU sits next to the USA, the UN and Russia in the Quartet: both cases that do not allow for direct NATO involvement.

Good Old NATO

Critics will maintain that we cannot do without NATO's unique capabilities, in terms of joint planning and interoperability. No other organization but NATO can conduct an operation like ISAF, the argument runs. But in many respects ISAF is a revealing operation. What we really see in Afghanistan is an able and willing coalition that runs the demanding southern and eastern regional commands, and a host of other countries doing something else in the more benign provinces. Out of ISAF's 46 contributors, non-NATO member Australia seamlessly joins combat operations in the South, while NATO member Germany is carrying out its national stabilization operation in the north, steered by the Bundestag rather than by NATO. **None of these countries would be able to sustain their operations without US enablers. So it is rather the US, and not necessarily NATO,** which is pivotal within ISAF.

Trading NATO for the EU-USA does not mean doing away with the *acquis atlantique*, but it **would mean doing away with a top-heavy alliance** that served its purpose well but increasingly stirs unease in Europe, while becoming less relevant to Washington – even if the newest US National Security Strategy routinely speaks of NATO as the pre-eminent security alliance in the world today. **NATO, or Europe, is nowhere as central in US security thinking as many Europeans like to believe.** When 9/11 occurred,

invoking the alliance's Article 5 only came as an afterthought. Paradoxically, this trend may be reinforced under a less traditionally inclined president Obama, no matter how enthusiastically his inauguration was celebrated in Europe. Moreover, **building a new relationship with the USA which is more balanced** than it is now would likely stimulate Europe to further boost its post-Second World War integration process.

Neg – Net Benefit

Internal Link---2NC

Cooperating on emerging technologies allows the US and the EU to compete with Chinese industrial policy

Robert **Atkinson 21**, President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, “Boosting Transatlantic Technology Cooperation,” The Globalist, 11-29-21, <https://www.theglobalist.com/boosting-transatlantic-technology-cooperation/> Web 7/1/22

Three steps

There are three key steps the **United States and Europe should take**. First, **stop fighting each other economically**. Resolving the long-standing Boeing-Airbus feud and focusing on the real challenger – China’s Comac – was a good first step. The United States eliminating its steel and aluminum tariffs on EU imports was a good second step. For its part, Europe, including member states like Germany and France, needs to dial back its “digital sovereignty” agenda which is targeted at the United States and U.S. companies. Second, both regions need to ramp up cooperation against unfair Chinese economic practices, including cooperation on cybersecurity, investment screening, bringing trade cases before the WTO and cooperative export controls.

Time for more formal EU-US technology policy cooperation

Finally, and most ambitiously, it is time for more formal EU-US technology policy cooperation.

In a world where the development of technology has become much more technologically complex, neither region is large enough to specialize in all major technologies. Therefore, each region should allow the other region’s companies to participate in government-funded industry research programs, like the EU’s Horizon 2020 program and similar U.S. programs that agencies like the National Science Foundation operate.

Moreover, as the governments roll out or expand specialized technology programs in technologies like 6G, energy storage, battery technology, autonomous systems, quantum computing and semiconductors, there should be joint collaboration between US and EU firms, universities and governments. Finally, governments should review and minimize or eliminate regulatory barriers to science and technology cooperation, including enabling easier cross-border work of scientists and engineers.

Conclusion

The sooner the **EU and the U.S. can stop seeing each other as the competition** and work to address the real technology competitiveness challenge – China – the more likely both regions can ensure their economic futures, while upholding critical values.

Internal Link---AI Collaboration---2NC

Collaborating with the EU on AI avoids the spread of Chinese digital authoritarianism

David **Klotsonis 22**, Intern with CEPA's Digital Innovation Initiative, et al. Bill Echikson, Editor of CEPA's Bandwidth content stream, "The Race to AI – Either the US and Europe Cooperate or China Wins," CEPA, 1-4-2022, <https://cepa.org/the-race-to-ai-either-the-us-and-europe-cooperate-or-china-wins/>, Web 6/25/22

In the US, these fears have led to **criticism of the government's go-slow approach**. David Edelman, director of MIT's Internet Policy Research Initiative and former White House advisor, worries about under-regulation. "It paints a false dichotomy for anybody to say that regulation is wholesale good or is wholesale bad for innovation," adds Terah Lyons, who shaped AI policy during the Obama administration and is currently the executive director of the Partnership on AI.

US inaction risks undermining its global influence. A poor track record at home could make it hard to convince others around the world to embrace ethical principles. The Biden administration wants to construct an alliance of democracies. **To do so, it must address the international debate over ethical AI.**

China, for its part, is heading international ethics boards and trying to set global (authoritarian-friendly) standards. The US must not let the authoritarians score cynical points. Instead, it must show it is serious about engaging with like-minded democracies. This means speaking with Europe and moving fast to impose an alternative regulatory framework, while also considering regulations of its own.

Europe, on the other hand, needs to slow down and avoid making its quest for "trustworthiness" into a choke on innovation. Otherwise, it risks seeing the most innovative software development flee to the continent and move to North America or to Asia. It must revise its overly broad definition of "risky" AI and limit the requirements for compliance to truly risky operations.

A deal is possible. **The US needs partners. Europe needs to avoid overregulation. Both sides must acknowledge that if democracies fight over AI, the ultimate winner risks being China.**

AT: EU Alone Solves---2NC

Only cooperation with the US can ensure EU tech norms to spread

Julian **Ringhof 22**, Visiting Fellow, et al. José Ignacio Torreblanca, Head, ECFR Madrid, Senior Fellow, 5-17-2022, "The geopolitics of technology: How the EU can become a global player", ECFR, <https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-geopolitics-of-technology-how-the-eu-can-become-a-global-player/>, Web 7/6/22

Today's major powers engage in comprehensive global technology politics. The weaponisation, mastering, and control of digital technologies is the new 'Great Game'. These power dynamics are helping shape technological spheres of influence. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific – but also in central Eastern Europe and the Balkans – have fallen or may soon fall under Chinese or Russian technological influence or dominance. **China is luring countries into technological dependencies** to undermine their political sovereignty through its Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative. Beijing also shields its own citizens from foreign influence with its 'great firewall' and develops industrial strategies to secure its technological autonomy from the West. It uses digital disinformation to influence public opinion in other countries, mounts cyberattacks and cyberespionage to strengthen its industrial base, strategically deploys attractively-priced 5G technologies abroad to gain control of telecom networks, and tries to impose its technical standards through international organisations.

Together with Russia, China is attempting to ingrain authoritarian values into the global cyberspace. Russia is also leveraging and restricting mass media and social networks to protect its interests, shielding its population from democratic temptations, and waging an information war against the West and its allies with the aim of undermining citizens' faith in democracy.

Meanwhile, **the United States tries to offset Chinese and Russian influence**, seeks to maintain its cutting-edge advantage on military artificial intelligence (AI) and other technologies, and backs and protects the interests of its major technology companies globally. It also denies other nations access to key technologies, monitors critical investments in the technology sector to avoid security risks, seeks to secure and control critical supply chains (especially of semiconductors), and imposes export controls and even embargoes on sensitive technologies.

As for the European Union, the Brussels institutions are trying to shape global standards of privacy and data protection, digital platforms, and AI according to European values using the attractiveness and power of its internal market. **The EU also promotes digital partnerships** with like-minded countries and allies – and announced, in December 2021, **the "Global Gateway" initiative as the EU version of China's DSR.**

All this implies that the EU **has begun to play the global technology game.** But it is nowhere near its rivals in terms of **sophistication, strategy, resources, and vision.** If the EU is to learn to speak the language of power, it needs to understand its efforts as part of an integrated digital strategy **that can both cooperate and compete with** those of China, Russia, and even the **US.**

Aff – Solvency

No Solvency---General

Too many issues mean there's no R&D cooperation---liability for failure, publishing and property rights, and legal jurisdiction over disputes

Richard L. **Hudson 21**, et al. Nicholas Wallace, Journalists, "US and EU look for ways to boost American participation in Horizon Europe R&D," Science|Business, 6-17-2021, <https://sciencebusiness.net/technology-strategy-board/news/us-and-eu-look-ways-boost-american-participation-horizon-europe-rd>, Web 6/13/22

One frequent sticking point has been liability. Under the just-ended predecessor programme, Horizon 2020, the Commission's standard model grant agreement includes language holding the partners in a project consortium jointly and severally liable. Some **American universities fret that opens them to too much risk.** But EU officials have long maintained that's an over-cautious interpretation, and point out that thousands of European organisations don't consider the contracts a problem. One solution under consideration for Horizon Europe, an academic source said, is to add language spelling out in more detail exactly what the liability might be for, rather than leaving the wording so broad

Another issue is publishing rights. Some US universities have been concerned that the contract terms – though generally requiring rapid and open communication of research results – could in rare circumstances allow partners or the Commission to hold up publication; some American universities worry that could put them in conflict with US law. One proposed solution is to make it clear that an individual partner could still proceed with publishing results about its own piece of the research project, regardless of what the other partners think.

There are several other issues: intellectual property rights, legal jurisdiction for contractual disputes, and more. The two sides had tried to iron out these differences in the waning days of the Obama Administration, and had signed an "implementing arrangement" to make it clear that Americans wouldn't be subject to the Commission's normal contractual terms if they weren't taking EU money. But in practice, that arrangement didn't help – according to US officials because Commission bureaucrats handling the grants didn't understand the problem, and according to EU officials because the American side didn't try. For a time, the US State Department actively discouraged US universities from joining Horizon projects.

The CP fails---more agents are needed to solve AND working with the United States limits the sovereignty of the EU

Ulrike **Franke 21**, Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, "Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI", European Council on Foreign Relations, 1-20-21, <https://ecfr.eu/publication/artificial-divide-how-europe-and-america-could-clash-over-ai/#why-work-together-disagreements-and-shared-goals>, Web 6/15/22

The transatlantic alliance has had a bad four years. The Trump administration's criticism of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the president's threats to leave NATO, and his active

criticism of the EU all made Europeans wonder whether they had lost their most important partner. Moreover, in light of the conflict over 5G, in the minds of many Europeans, technology in particular has become an area that creates conflict in the transatlantic relationship rather than fostering cooperation.

Although transatlantic relations are likely to improve under Biden, substantial damage has been done, and it will take some time to mend these ties. But, even if relations improve, it is becoming increasingly obvious that US has a diminishing interest in Europe as a geopolitically important part of the world. This trend was already visible under Trump's predecessor, Barack Obama. It is, therefore, unsurprising that, on technology cooperation, both sides emphasise the importance of working with other actors as well as each other. The US National Security Commission on AI, for example, recommends that the US Departments of State and Defense "should negotiate formal AI cooperation agreements with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam". Its March 2020 report emphasises on several occasions the importance of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Meanwhile, Europeans are pursuing the idea of an alliance for multilateralism. And, on technology and AI more specifically, they have also begun to reach out to other democratic allies.

European digital autonomy

The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in response to isolationist tendencies in the US, Europeans have become much more comfortable talking about European strategic autonomy or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its own right. In the technological realm, this led to the idea of European digital sovereignty, the aim of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are forces to protect against. European thinking on technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to build up digital sovereignty may impede transatlantic cooperation.

No Solvency---NATO Key

No Solvency---NATO deterrence is key to an effective EU

Dr. Jakub J. **Grygiel 20**, Associate Professor at the Catholic University of America and Fellow at The Institute for Human Ecology, Ph.D., M.A. and MPA from Princeton University, "Vladimir Putin's Encirclement of Europe", National Review, 3/19/2020, <https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2020/04/06/vladimir-putins-encirclement-of-europe/>, Web 7/13/22

Rather than uniting Europe, **Russia's encircling embrace** of the Continent is **dividing it**. In fact, Europe will become progressively more divided between nations that seek an accommodation with Russia (e.g., France) and those that seek to stop its enveloping expansionism (e.g., Poland, the Baltic states). The threat assessment will vary among countries depending on their proximity to Russia and therefore on their vulnerability to a Russian military attack, on their dependence on Russian energy supplies, or on their reliance on the Russian ability to stem the flow of migrants. Some European countries will choose to oppose and deter Russia to protect their political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Others will see Russia as a benefactor, a supplier of needed natural resources or of stability in North Africa and the Middle East. This is not a prediction of a future scenario but a description of the current landscape. There is not, and will not be, a unified European political will to impose costs on Russia and to develop a coherent strategy to deter further Russian expansion.

Such a situation creates a great leadership opportunity for the United States. Because Europe and its institutions cannot resolve the deep divisions on the Continent, the ability of the United States to shape European dynamics will only increase, if it chooses to exercise that ability. The only power capable of slowing the ongoing Russian encirclement of Europe is the U.S., in part through its leadership in NATO but in part on its own with a select group of interested allies. The United States can therefore limit some of the intra-European divisions by removing the source of insecurity, mitigating the effects of the geopolitical encirclement of Europe by Russia. This is the logic that characterized much of the transatlantic dynamics of the last century: U.S.-led protection allowed Europe to be confident and united. There is nothing to indicate that conditions have dramatically changed and that therefore this logic has become obsolete.

No Solvency---AI---Ethical AI

Disagreements on the amount of ethical AI regulations stops effective policy

David **Klotsonis 22**, Intern with CEPA's Digital Innovation Initiative, et al. Bill Echikson, Editor of CEPA's Bandwidth content stream, "The Race to AI – Either the US and Europe Cooperate or China Wins," CEPA, 1-4-2022, <https://cepa.org/the-race-to-ai-either-the-us-and-europe-cooperate-or-china-wins/>, Web 6/23/22

While the EU and US agree on the need to cooperate on AI regulation and offer alternatives to China's authoritarian model, they are moving at different speeds.

Europe is racing ahead. The Artificial Intelligence Act, proposed in April 2021, requires software developers to comply with a detailed list of technical and auditing requirements for "high risk" applications. These European rules make Washington uncomfortable.

In contrast, the US so far has imposed few concrete regulatory steps and refuses to join international partnerships. **When UNESCO's 193 member countries approved a first-of-its-kind recommendation for AI ethics in November 2021, the US did not sign.**

Without a transatlantic partnership, China and Russia will face little opposition to spreading their authoritarian approach, leveraging the technology for mass surveillance. At the recent CEPA Forum, former Google Chairman Eric Schmit noted, ominously, that "China is producing more AI papers than the US."

Although Brussels and Washington say they agree on the importance of promoting ethical AI – prohibiting software that produces social scoring and facial recognition in public places – they do not seem to agree on how to achieve this goal. The EU's AI Act labels different technologies that fall under the term 'AI' by their risk. "Minimal" and "limited" risk applications, which represent the vast majority of technologies currently employed, will face few restrictions. But high-risk systems will be subject to strict obligations. Unacceptable-risk applications (such as social scoring) will be banned.

In contrast, key American decision-makers believe that it is premature to regulate a technology that we struggle to understand. "Europe's proposed AI regulation" is "sensible, written in European public policy language," says former Google CEO Schmidt, who chaired the US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence and co-authored the recent book *The Age of AI*. "But in the middle of it, it says that for critical infrastructure, you cannot deploy it, unless the AI system can explain itself. There is no AI system today that can explain itself. The technology is not there."

US business and policymakers fear Europe's regulation will hamper innovation. According to the Center for Data Innovation, Europe's AI Act could cost the continent's economy upwards of €30 billion over the next five years. In their recent paper, researchers Mikołaj Barczentewicz and Benjamin Mueller offer a series of concrete examples which could be banned in Europe. **A school's admission office could be blocked from using a Microsoft Excel macro to check a student's eligibility. A small business would no longer be able to use a computer to check whether job applicants have the correct professional license.**

No one doubts the need for reigning in the most dangerous types of AI. President Trump supported transatlantic initiatives such as the Global Partnership on AI and the AI Partnership on Defense. The

Biden Administration has pushed forward a National AI Initiative Act in 2020 that mandates the federal government to provide oversight and guidance for a “trustworthy AI.”

Without concrete restrictions, however, **Europeans fear that individual rights and freedoms will be threatened.** Studies show that **unchecked AI could increase gender and racial discrimination.**

Researchers from the Oxford Internet Institute see risks in a wide range of fields, ranging from finance to aviation.

No Solvency---Biotech

Too many obstacles to the EU's biotech development---funding, regulations, and lack of investors

Helena **Vieira 16**, Contributor, 11-17-2016, "Biotechnology: Why does Europe lag behind the US?," LSE Business Review, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2016/11/17/biotechnology-why-does-europe-lag-behind-the-us/> Web 7/14/22

European scientists had been responsible for several of the discoveries which paved the way for new commercial opportunities. But American entrepreneurs were much quicker to exploit the new techniques than their European counterparts. The most successful of the pioneers, Genentech, was founded in 1976 and launched its first drug, a genetically engineered version of insulin, in 1982. It was followed by a host of imitators, many of which listed their shares on the stock market.

The success of these firms owed a great deal to the ingenuity and vision of their founders, but the US had other advantages which supported the growth of the sector. Biomedical research was funded on a very large scale by the Federal government, contributing both to advances in knowledge and to the supply of well-trained scientists. American universities were well equipped, especially after the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, for transferring the results of academic research into industry. The US had a venture capital industry which had experience in nurturing early-stage firms, especially in electronics, and could apply the same skills to biotechnology. The safety and efficacy of new drugs were regulated in the same way as in Europe, but there were no government controls over prices; the US market was not only much larger than any single European country, but also more rewarding for innovators.

Among European countries the UK seemed well equipped to follow the US lead, not least because of its strength in biomedical research. A missing ingredient was venture capital, and that was part of the rationale for using public funds to support the establishment of Celltech, the UK's first biotech firm, in 1980. But Celltech was soon followed by a stream of wholly private-sector firms, and by the mid-1990s a sizeable biotech sector, well supported by local investors, was taking shape. Then came a series of setbacks, as failures in clinical trials exposed the over-optimism of some of the most highly valued firms. The result was an investor retreat. From the early 2000s the inflow of capital dried up, and several of the best firms either were acquired or moved to the US. Despite a partial recovery in 2014 and 2015, the gap between the US and the UK is probably wider today than it was at the start of the new millennium.

Some observers believe that the failure of UK biotech to build on its apparently promising start was due to short-termism, the reluctance of institutional investors to back high-risk, science-based firms whose research may not pay off for ten years or more. Yet countries such as Germany which have a more patient, long-term approach to the financing of companies have been no more successful than the UK in biotechnology. The lag behind the US is a European, not a purely British phenomenon.

How did the US do so well? First-mover advantage is part of the answer, coupled with the fact that (alongside numerous failures) several of the pioneers produced blockbuster drugs within very few years of their foundation. These star performers attracted investor support to what came to be seen as a high-risk but potentially high-reward business. As more scientist-entrepreneurs entered the market,

the increasing size and sophistication of the **investor community** committed to biotech meant that promising firms could access capital on a scale that was not available in Europe.

The sheer scale of the **US biotech sector**, much of it being concentrated in Boston and San Francisco, is a huge competitive advantage, and there are other features of the US health care system which are difficult or impossible for European countries to imitate. For example, **there is no way in which the European Union**, with or without the UK, **can match** the amount spent by **the US National Institutes of Health on biomedical research**. Nor, given the determination of European governments to keep control of their national health care arrangements, is there is any possibility of a **genuinely integrated European market for medicines**, let alone one in which drug companies have the same pricing freedom as in the US. Even if that freedom is curtailed under the next US administration, American leadership in biotechnology is unlikely to be seriously challenged.

The industry is chronically underfunded

European Commission N.D., The governing body of the EU, "CORDIS," European Commission, <https://cordis.europa.eu/article/id/25740-eu-biotech-industry-victim-of-chronic-underfunding>, Web 7/9/22

The EU's biotechnology industry is the victim of underfunding, causing it to lag significantly behind the US, according to a report commissioned by EuropaBio, the European association of bio-industries.

The report compares the EU Member States, Switzerland and Norway to the US, and explores the situation in individual Member States. The results show a gulf between the biotechnology industries of the EU and US. There are roughly the same number of companies in the EU as in the US - 2,163 to 1,991 respectively - but the EU companies are smaller, newer, receive a fraction of the funding, and grow more slowly than their US counterparts.

A closer look at the data reveals a bigger gulf - the US companies hire double the number of employees, spend three times as much on research and development (R&D), and generate double the venture capital compared to their US cousins. US companies generate 10 times the debt finance compared to EU biotechnology companies.

'Venture capital is a luxury,' said John Hodgson of Critical I, the lead author of the paper. **Less than 10 per cent of European companies win venture funds each year.** But it is an indispensable luxury. Only properly capitalised companies can hope to compete globally in knowledge-intensive industries like biotechnology,' he said.

However, the news is not all bad. Europe has the potential to nurture and grow the large number of new biotechnology companies established each year. In 2004, more than 100 new biotechnology companies started researching and trading. **They all currently suffer from underfunding,** and the industry suffers as a result, but increased funding could transform the situation on the ground.

'Europe can be a breeding ground for European companies, or it can be a greenhouse for high-technology firms that are acquired by better funded US firms. **The development of technology will follow the money that allows it to develop. Europe needs to make sure that the money is here,**' said Mr Hodgson.

However, a closer look at the data shows that some European countries seem to nurture biotechnology better than others. Portugal, Finland, Hungary, Switzerland, Ireland and the UK all have a larger proportion of older companies, indicating there is a better climate for success in those places. Older companies generate the bulk of the European biotechnology revenue and invest the most money in R&D, but they, too, are under pressure.

Underfunding also limits how European companies can grow. Two-thirds of European biotechnology companies employ fewer than 20 people, double the number employed in the US. **New European companies are also more likely to fold than their US counterparts - again due to their lower revenues and investment in people** and R&D.

Most worrying, successful European companies have discovered a convenient solution to the lack of EU funding - **moving to the US**. This gives them ready access to their much larger finance markets available in the US.

No Solvency---Biotech---Vaccine Diplomacy

There's no EU vaccine credibility---they've failed to contain the virus, enlargement policy fails, and authoritarian states beat them to vaccine diplomacy

Ana E. **Juncos 21**, Professor of European politics at the University of Bristol, 7-8-2021, "Vaccine Geopolitics and the EU's Ailing Credibility in the Western Balkans," Carnegie Europe, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/07/08/vaccine-geopolitics-and-eu-s-ailing-credibility-in-western-balkans-pub-84900>, Web 7/5/22

The coronavirus pandemic has had a threefold negative impact on the EU's efforts to promote democracy in the Western Balkans. First, the crisis has eroded liberal democracy in the region, as national governments have adopted restrictive measures to deal with the health emergency. Second, it has further undermined the EU's credibility, which was already low before the pandemic, as the union has struggled to contain the crisis within its borders and failed to extend its solidarity to neighboring countries. Third, the pandemic has provided fertile ground for authoritarian powers to fill the void left by the EU and strengthen their influence in the region, boosting support for alternative political models.

The coronavirus comes on the back of a wider crisis of liberal democracy but has also exacerbated it. The pandemic has had a significant adverse impact on the state of democracy around the world by leading to restrictions on fundamental freedoms, increasing the concentration of power with executives, and curtailing the roles of national parliaments. The geopolitics of vaccines is another manifestation of this crisis: authoritarian regimes use vaccine donations in the Western Balkans and elsewhere to undermine Western liberal democracies—or what is left of them.

Although it did not cause it, the coronavirus has accelerated an illiberal turn in the region. Stabilitocrats such as Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić have used the pandemic to strengthen their grip on power. These leaders, who are seen by the West as providing stability while in fact undermining democracy internally, have confirmed trends of democratic backsliding by restricting the freedom of expression, the right to privacy, and press freedom.

The Western Balkans are not the only countries where the coronavirus has had a deleterious effect on the health of democratic systems, as EU countries also testify. However, weaker democracies, such as those in the Western Balkans, are generally more susceptible to authoritarian tendencies and the deterioration of fundamental freedoms than are states with stronger democratic institutions. In the case of coronavirus policy responses, as one study into democracy in times of the pandemic notes, "strong protection of democratic principles already established in 'normal' times makes governments more reluctant to opt for restrictive policies."

Since the pandemic will not be the last crisis to hit the Western Balkans, strengthening democratic quality and the rule of law in the region can moderate the negative impacts of governments' emergency responses on individual liberties and reduce the likelihood of so-called pandemic backsliding. The EU's support for democracy in the Western Balkans is therefore needed more than ever. Yet, the EU's enlargement policy toward the region has languished over the past decade, with little or no progress to report. Credibility has been the main casualty after years of inconsistency and uncertainty; the pandemic has only worsened the situation.

During the coronavirus crisis, the EU's enlargement policy has continued to disappoint those who hoped that the prospect of accession could counteract the impact of authoritarian forces and geopolitical competition in the region. Despite the EU's launch of a new enlargement methodology in February 2020 and the bloc's decision to open accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia in June, negotiations with these two countries have been stalled since December by a Bulgarian veto over a linguistic and historical dispute. At its June 2021 meeting, the EU Council again failed to formally open negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, striking another blow to the failing credibility of the EU's enlargement policy.

No Solvency---Cyber

Cyber-cooperation fails---lack of information sharing and bureaucratic obstacles

Laura **Kabelka 22**, Contributor, "EU's cyber incident reporting mechanism does not work, agency chief warns," euractiv, 2-5-2022, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/cybersecurity/news/eus-cyber-incident-reporting-mechanism-does-not-work-agency-chief-warns/>

The head of the EU's flagship cybersecurity agency has warned that its **incident reporting system is too bureaucratic** and "does not work", and called for a more resilient system, as well as a better legislative environment and information sharing with member states.

Juhan Lepassaar, the executive director of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), voiced his concerns at a roundtable on cybersecurity on Tuesday (26 April).

Other cybersecurity experts have also raised **concerns over the effectiveness** of the mechanism for reporting and responding to cyber threats. An update of the EU Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS), which should address these shortcomings, is currently being negotiated.

"We need something which is agile, that works and where information can be shared in a secure manner," Lepassaar added. "More resilience in critical sectors is definitely something we need to look at."

Bart Groothuis, the EU lawmaker leading the revision of the NIS directive, told EURACTIV that besides the problem of information sharing, also the computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) need to be improved via the revamped legislation.

West warns of Russian cyberattacks on critical infrastructure

Western governments jointly warned on Wednesday (20 April) about a potential threat of increased malicious cyber activity by Russia against critical infrastructure as a response to sanctions imposed as punishment for its invasion of Ukraine.

Reporting cyber incidents

According to ENISA, cybersecurity breach reporting is vital, not only for the public but also to help authorities recognise and respond to current trends and weaknesses. In 2018, the NIS directive introduced cybersecurity incident notification rules for operators of essential services in critical sectors.

Nevertheless, for ENISA's executive director, the current legislative environment is not working. For example, in 2021, zero cross-border incidents were reported under the NIS directive, even though the SharkBot Trojan attacked a number of banks and there was an attack on a European e-ticketing platform.

"The problem is that we are **dependent on the information** that we get from the member states," added Lepassaar, noting **that lack of information sharing** jeopardises the agency's ability to respond and improve Europe's cybersecurity and resilience strategy.

In its current state, the cyber incident reporting system is too "cumbersome" and "bureaucratic", according to Lepassaar, which explains why member states would refrain from using it. He calls for a more agile approach, better communication and for more resilience in critical sectors.

Funding is a major obstacle to effective EU cybersecurity---red tape and lack of tracking

ECA 19, European Council of Auditors, “Challenges to effective EU cybersecurity policy”, March 2019, https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/BRP_CYBERSECURITY/BRP_CYBERSECURITY_EN.pdf, Web 7/14/22

Total global cybersecurity spending as a percentage of GDP is estimated to be about 0.1 %. In the United States 63, this rises to about 0.35 % (including the private sector). As a percentage of GDP, US federal government spending is around 0.1 %, or around \$21 billion budgeted for 2019.

Spending in the EU has been low by comparison, fragmented and often not backed by concerted government-led programmes. Figures are hard to come by, but EU public spending on cybersecurity is estimated to range between one and two billion euros per year. Some Member States’ spending as a percentage of GDP is one-tenth of US levels, or even lower. The EU and its Member States need to know how much they are investing collectively to know which gaps to close.

It is difficult to form a comprehensive picture in the absence of clear data owing to cybersecurity’s cross-cutting nature and because cybersecurity and general IT spending are often indistinguishable. Our survey has confirmed that it is difficult to obtain reliable statistics on spending in both the public and private sectors. Threequarters of the national audit offices reported having no centralised overview of cyberrelated government spending, and not one Member State obliged public entities to report cybersecurity expenditure separately in their financial plans.

Scaling up public and private investment in Europe’s cybersecurity firms is a particular challenge. Public capital is often available for the initial phases, but less so for the growth and expansion stages. Numerous EU funding initiatives exist but are not being taken advantage of, largely due to red tape. Overall, EU cybersecurity firms underperform against their international peers: fewer in number, the average amount of funding they raise is significantly lower. Ensuring effective targeting and funding of start-ups is therefore crucial to achieving the EU’s digital policy objectives

There’s major fragmentation, insufficient patents, and results aren’t scaled up

ECA 19, European Council of Auditors, “Challenges to effective EU cybersecurity policy”, March 2019, https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/BRP_CYBERSECURITY/BRP_CYBERSECURITY_EN.pdf, Web 7/14/22

Closing the cyber investment gap needs to yield useful outcomes. For example, despite the strength of the EU’s research and innovation sector, results are not sufficiently patented, commercialised or scaled up to help strengthen resilience, competitiveness and digital autonomy. This is especially the case when compared with the EU’s global competitors. The paucity of properly harnessed results stems from a range of factors, including: the lack of a consistent transnational strategy to scale up the approach to fit the EU’s wider digital needs for competitiveness and increased autonomy; o the length of the value chain cycle, which means tools soon become obsolete; o the lack of sustainability as projects typically end with the dissolution of the project team and a discontinuation of support, including updates and patching solutions.

The Commission's proposal to establish a network of cybersecurity competence centres and a research competence centre is **an attempt to overcome fragmentation** in the cybersecurity research field and to spur investment at scale. In total, there are some 665 centres of expertise across the EU.

Aff – Perm

Perm Do Both

US, EU, and NATO cooperation enhances European security institutions

AICGS 21, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, “The Future of Transatlantic Security,” 3-10-2021, <https://www.aicgs.org/2021/05/the-future-of-transatlantic-security/>, Web 7/1/22

The 2020/21 U.S. and German elections as well as recent EU and NATO strategic reflection processes (Strategic Compass and NATO 2030, respectively) should present new opportunities for an even stronger and enhanced transatlantic security partnership. There have been important efforts, particularly over the past few years, to assure that security cooperation between the two institutions is transparent and mutually reinforcing. Maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean has addressed migrant trafficking and smuggling, to name an example. In other examples, NATO and the EU have coordinated procedures through parallel exercises that have heightened security for both organizations.

The EU Strategic Compass will sharpen the understanding of what Europeans expect the EU to be able to do – and what not to do – in security and defense based on the core assumption that the EU should work closely with international partners whenever possible (even while developing the ability to act alone when necessary). In this respect, the decision of the United States to seek participation in the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) Military Mobility project has been a milestone in cooperation and will further enhance the project and EU-NATO cooperation in general.

But as the United States and the European Union deepen their security partnership, they need to be clear about what they want from each other. It is time to revitalize the transatlantic partnership. The potential and importance of addressing emerging technologies and force modernization will be necessary to assure strong NATO-EU institutions ready for future challenges, including hybrid and cyber threats, disinformation, and artificial intelligence.

There is a need to develop more coherent policies that address shared potential external threats. How do we as partners and allies deal with China and Russia, the former an emerging threat far from Europe and the latter posing quite different geopolitical as well as economic/energy challenges for the United States and Europe? With Iran and its potential for nuclear proliferation? With these challenges in mind, three working groups developed recommendations for future cooperation.

Both the EU and NATO are essential to proper defense BUT even then, the EU can’t be a replacement or duplicate for NATO

Jim **Garamone 17**, “NATO Secretary General Stresses Change, European Union Integration”, US Dept of Defense, 12/20, <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1401214/nato-secretary-general-stresses-change-european-union-integration/>, Web 7/2/22

NATO Stronger With EU

“NATO is strengthening its collective defense and, at the same time, projecting stability in its neighborhood,” Stoltenberg said. “Both of those are more effective when NATO and the European Union work together.” Stoltenberg had one big statistic to back up his claim: About 94 percent of the EU’s population lives in a NATO member nation. Talks continue and the two alliances have made progress. “We have boosted our cooperation on cyber defense, maritime security, fighting terrorism

and countering hybrid warfare, among many other things,” the secretary general said. “Neither NATO nor the European Union have all the tools to tackle the challenges alone, but together we are a formidable force for good.” He called on France, a founding member of both NATO and the EU, to play a key role to ensure the coherence of these efforts. “I am convinced a strong European defense is good for the European Union, it is good for Europe and it is good for NATO, as long as it respects three key principles,” he said. Build, Strengthen, Compliment The first is to build the necessary capabilities: spending more and spending better. That means tackling the fragmentation of the European defense industry. “The U.S. has one type of main battle tank, while Europe has 17 different types,” he said. “The U.S. has four types of frigates and destroyers; Europe has 29. The U.S. has six types of fighter planes; Europe has 20.” He does not want to eliminate competition, but he does want to see some coherence, interoperability and cost savings in the process. **“Second, a stronger European defense also needs to involve non-EU allies** to the fullest possible extent, of course respecting the autonomy and integrity of the European Union,” he said. Stoltenberg said nations on both sides of the Atlantic continue to be engaged in European security. “For the first time in years, the United States and Canada are increasing their military presence on our continent,” he said. “And, after Brexit, non-EU allies will account for 80 percent of NATO defense spending, and three of the four battle groups in the eastern part of the alliance will be led by non-EU allies.” **There is no way the EU can replace NATO,** he said, but it could strengthen the European pillar of the alliance. Finally, a stronger European defense needs to compliment, not duplicate, NATO’s own efforts. “On duplications, for instance, NATO already has a well-established defense planning process,” Stoltenberg said. “We’ve had it for decades, and as part of that process, we identify in detail the capabilities that each ally needs to deliver to ensure the alliance has the tools it needs to do its job. **It would be a mistake for the EU to duplicate that process.** Capitals should not be faced with two conflicting lists for capability requirements.” “We share 22 members, so to compete would be like competing with ourselves,” he continued. “That makes no sense. Our roles are distinct but mutually reinforcing. We must work together in a coherent way.”

Aff – Net Benefit

No China Tech Dominance---2AC

China can't gain tech dominance---other countries fill in, even without the US.

Michael D. **Swaine 21**, Director of the East Asia program at the Quincy Institute, Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, "China Doesn't Pose an Existential Threat for America," Foreign Policy, 04-21-2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/21/china-existential-threat-america/>, Web 5/22/22

Some observers claim that Beijing could somehow set standards in critical technology areas and install tech hardware around the world, to the extent that China would be able to relegate the United States to a permanently inferior status in both the commercial and military realms, thus threatening the very existence of the country. This is also highly unlikely.

Chinese companies are certainly participating in standard-setting in key areas, including 5G. But **this process is highly competitive** globally, and U.S., Asian, and European companies all hold major portions of the standards and the standard-essential patents that undergird the global technology ecosystem. **There is little if any chance that Chinese companies could come to dominate this process.** Many tech experts state that the most likely worst-case outcome of Chinese gains regarding standards and hardware would be a fragmented technology ecosystem that would impoverish all countries, not give China a level of power that would enable it to vanquish the United States.

More realistically, Beijing might over time exclude high-tech companies in the United States and other countries from its market, which might make it difficult for them to continue to grow and innovate. And Chinese financing power and supply chains could conceivably create a kind of "turnkey" solution in some developing countries that lock them into a Chinese tech ecosystem. But such developments would come nowhere near to constituting an existential threat to the United States, given the global reach of non-Chinese high-tech companies and the overall limited reach of any Chinese high-tech ecosystem in the developing world in the face of such competition.

No impact---China isn't trying and couldn't scale up if they did.

Michael D. **Swaine 21**, Director of the East Asia program at the Quincy Institute, Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, "China Doesn't Pose an Existential Threat for America," Foreign Policy, 04-21-2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/21/china-existential-threat-america/> Web 5/22/22

Finally, the latter set of supposedly existential normative or ideological threats consists of many elements, including Beijing's possible overturning of the so-called global liberal international order, Chinese influence operations aimed at U.S. society, the export of China's political values and state-directed economic approach, and its sale of surveillance technologies and other items that facilitate the rise or strengthening of authoritarian states. These threats all seem hair-raising at first glance. But while significant, they are greatly exaggerated and do not rise to the level of constituting an existential threat.

Beijing has little interest in exporting its governance system, and where it does, it is almost entirely directed at developing countries, not industrial democracies such as the United States. In addition, there is no evidence to indicate that the Chinese are actually engaged in compelling or actively persuading countries to follow their experience. Rather, they want developing nations to study from and copy China's approach because doing so would help to legitimize the Chinese system both internationally and more importantly to Beijing's domestic audience.

In addition, the notion that Beijing is deliberately attempting to control other countries and make them more authoritarian by entrapping them in debt and selling them “Big Brother” hardware such as surveillance systems is unsupported by the facts. Chinese banks show little desire to extend loans that will fail, and the failures that do occur are mostly due to poor feasibility studies and the incompetence and excessive zeal of lenders and/or borrowers. Moreover, in both loan-giving and surveillance equipment sales, China has shown no specific preference for nondemocratic over democratic states.

Even if Beijing were to attempt to export its development approach to other states, the actual attractiveness of that approach would prove to be highly limited. The **features** undergirding China’s developmental success **are not replicable for most** (if any) **countries**. These include a high savings rate; a highly acquisitive and entrepreneurial cultural environment; a state-owned banking system and nonconvertible currency; many massive state-owned industries that exist to provide employment, facilitate party control over key sectors, and drive huge infrastructure construction; and strong controls over virtually all information flows. Moreover, such a model (if you can call it that) is almost certainly not sustainable in its present form, given China’s aging population, extensive corruption, very large levels of income inequality, inadequate social safety net, and the fact that free information flows are required to drive global innovation.

Although China’s combination of economic reform policies and authoritarian political system has been around since the early 1980s, not a single nation has adopted that system either willingly or under Chinese compulsion. There are certainly many authoritarian states and fragile democracies on China’s periphery, but none of them were made that way by China.

The lead is fake---propaganda proves

Elsa B. **Kania 19**, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Lindsey R. Sheppard, Associate Fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Why Huawei Isn’t So Scary”, Foreign Policy, 10/12/2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/12/huawei-china-5g-race-technology/> Web 5/22/22

The idea that Huawei has an insurmountable lead in the 5G race also represents a failure of observers to distinguish its carefully crafted image from any real technological edge. To be sure, Huawei has long pursued 5G. Since 2007, it has invested massively in next-generation telecommunications, spending more than \$60 billion on research and development over the course of a decade. And the company now plans to increase its 5G investments as part of an annual R&D budget that may exceed \$15 billion.

Huawei truly does provide mature and cost-effective equipment. It is one of the few players offering an end-to-end 5G solution, with particular strengths in radio access networking. However, it’s unclear how well the company’s systems integrate with existing 4G infrastructure from other vendors. The security of Huawei’s products has been assessed to be **subpar**, and the **long-term performance** of its 5G networks also remains **questionable**. Countries that choose this low-cost option for fear of losing out in the 5G race risk creating an unstable and insecure foundation for their future societies and economies.

Although Huawei may assert that it has already taken an unbeatable lead in 5G infrastructure, judging who’s truly ahead in the field means looking at multiple criteria. Such indicators can include commercial

contracts, deployed performance, integration with network infrastructure, and real technological innovation. For example, Huawei has claimed that it has more 5G patents than all U.S. companies combined, but **quantity does not necessarily correlate with quality**—especially in **China**, where patents are often of **dubious value**.

Huawei CEO Ren Zhengfei has declared that his company’s dream is to “stand on top of the world.” But the global supply chain remains highly interdependent—a point of leverage that Washington is seeking to exploit by potentially limiting Huawei’s access to U.S. technologies. Moreover, Huawei’s competitors have their own core strengths among the fundamental technologies that will shape 5G. And although Huawei’s promise of relative vertical integration may offer efficiencies, the **diversity** of competitive suppliers continues to drive both competition and innovation. A number of companies based in the **United States**, **European Union**, **South Korea**, **Taiwan**, and **Japan** are also **industry leaders and major providers throughout the supply chain**. A healthy ecosystem for telecommunications would be based on market diversity and fair competition and would emphasize the importance of regulatory bodies, standards, and industry alliances to ensure security and interoperability.

Internal Link Turn---2AC

Turn---leveraging the partnership against Chinese tech dominance causes the spread of Chinese influence

Erica D. **Borghard 20**, Senior fellow with the New American Engagement Center at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council., 12-9-2020, "Emerging Technology and a Reimagined U.S.-EU Partnership," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/emerging-technology-and-reimagined-us-eu-partnership>, Web 7/13/22

Of greater concern is that this proposal's overarching framework is based on a partnership of like-minded democracies. This risks muddying the waters between economic and political issues. While there are certainly liberal democratic values that lie at the heart of many of the technology policy positions of the United States and Europe, such as privacy and speech protections, leveraging democracy as the partnership's fundamental organizing principle risks alienating potential partners with overlapping economic interests. In turn, this feeds China's ability to frame the global narrative as a contest between autocratic and democratic systems, enabling Beijing to pull away potential collaborators to a U.S.-EU partnership, such as Hungary. Moreover, framing the entire partnership in terms of a confrontation with China risks vitiating the opportunity for collaboration with China in areas of shared interest—even if they could be narrow.

And, rivalrous international research stop important collaboration

Tommy **Shih 22**, 7-13-2022, "It's getting harder for scientists to collaborate across borders – that's bad when the world faces global problems like pandemics and climate change," Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/its-getting-harder-for-scientists-to-collaborate-across-borders-thats-bad-when-the-world-faces-global-problems-like-pandemics-and-climate-change-184800>, Web 7/16/22

The U.S. government has taken significant steps to try to limit China's scientific progress and international influence. In 2018, the U.S. launched a large-scale anti-espionage effort called the China Initiative. Under this initiative, the FBI broadly investigated U.S.-Chinese links within the corporate and academic sectors. The China Initiative failed to find any Chinese spies. But three U.S.-based scholars were convicted for failing to disclose Chinese ties.

The China Initiative has faced heavy criticism from researchers, university leaders and civil rights organizations because of claims of ethnic profiling. The Biden administration officially canceled the initiative in February 2022. But efforts to curtail China's science and technology industries through trade sanctions on companies like Huawei restrict American companies from doing business with Chinese tech firms. The China Initiative and sanctions have also made researchers on both sides wary of collaboration.

The European Union has taken a similar stance. It calls China simultaneously a partner, competitor and systemic rival. The EU has outlined goals of increasing European scientific and technological autonomy to reduce reliance on other countries, especially China, and started to implement the strategy in 2021.

China is also using science, technology and scholarly research generally to serve national interests. The government has explicitly pushed the idea that research shall primarily serve national needs, and Chinese scholars are increasingly under political control. In 2021 there were 18 research centers

devoted to studying and promoting Xi Jinping's ideas on matters such as rule of law, economics and green development.

Global consequences

Many researchers in the U.S., Europe and China have voiced concerns that **geopolitical rivalries are curtailing international research collaboration** at a time when the world needs it the most.

There is a major risk that the impediments to international scientific collaboration will further increase, further harming data sharing, the quality of research and the ability to disseminate results that contributing to solving problems. I often hear researchers, university leaders and funding agencies in Europe, the U.S. and China vent their frustration with the current situation. Many in the research community would like to see a **more open and global science landscape.**

It is possible to work toward a future where **science is more separate** – but not naively isolated – **from changing power dynamics.** As issues like climate change increase in severity, it will become only more important that researchers build international relationships that are responsible, reciprocal, transparent and equitable.