CP – DOS – NDCA Starter

Summary

This counterplan gets rid of all security cooperation activities that the Department of Defense (DOD) currently undertakes, and shifts those responsibilities to the State Department (DOS) under the mantle of "security assistance". It then reforms the DOS in order for it to undertake these new responsibilities. The benefit to this is that the militarized approach that the DOD uses in their security cooperation efforts will be sidelined in favor of more diplomatic efforts needed in delicate situations like Ukraine.

The main affirmative arguments are:

• Permutation do the counterplan – the AFF will attempt to contest that security cooperation does not require the DOD, and could potentially be implemented through an exclusively State-Department run program. The negative should read evidence on this question to argue that even if the DOS could potentially be involved in Security Cooperation, it still necessitates some portion of DOD involvement.

• Permutation do the AFF and the counterplan in all other instances – the plan's security cooperation could be run through DOD while transferring all other security cooperation to the DOS, accessing the internal net benefit. The negative should argue why DOD involvement in specifically the plan is bad.

• Solvency deficits – arguments about the DOD being key to the aff's presumably military-related activities are especially good.

• DIB DA – a short DA about how severing all DOD security cooperation would likely collapse the US defense industrial base. The negative should make uniqueness arguments and read impact defense.

The main negative arguments are:

• Internal net benefit – the net benefit of militarized foreign policy likely interacts with aff impacts in favorable ways, providing turns case arguments along the lines of "the plan antagonizes whoever they're trying to deter but the CP doesn't because it's more diplomatic".

• Strong pushes against solvency deficits – almost anything the DOD can do, the State Department can do as well.

NEG

1NC Shell

OFF

The United States federal government should:

• abolish its security cooperation activities, transferring all relevant resources and responsibilities to the State Department;

• expand and train the security assistance workforce at the State Department;

• review and optimize the State Department's security assistance structure for interagency prioritization, planning, and dispute resolution.

• [Insert plan mandate without using the phrase "security cooperation"]

Shifting responsibility for aid and reforming the State Department solves better – creates more <u>coherent</u> and <u>effective</u> policy.

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

To change this, <u>there is a straightforward solution:</u> **give the State Department the money**. A new administration and new <u>Congress should redirect</u> almost <u>all</u> of <u>the **DOD's security assistance resources to the State Department** and **build up the State Department's capacity to administer assistance**</u>. Clearly, <u>such a transfer must be accompanied by **swift** and **far-reaching internal reforms** at the State Department to enable this expanded role,</u> but such reforms are long overdue and should not deter this bold step.

<u>This proposal would</u> help to <u>fix</u> many of the challenges of <u>a duplicative, bifurcated security assistance system that spans multiple U.S. agencies and involves thousands of personnel. It would **enable more coherent overall policy** on American security assistance, allowing aid decisions to be guided by **general foreign policy concerns** and **current priorities**. It would</u> better <u>allow</u> for ensuring <u>that U.S. assistance comports with American values, including working closely with democratic states and prioritizing</u> respect for <u>human rights.</u>

Otherwise, militarized foreign policy sparks war thru <u>miscalculation</u>

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

As a result, as <u>the United States sought to provide more security assistance</u> to partners, it did so <u>through the DOD. This</u> has <u>created a bifurcated bureaucratic structure for</u> administering <u>security assistance that marginalizes the State Department. The current system is both **inefficient** and **ill-suited for the present foreign policy environment.**</u> <u>The new era of great power competition and</u>

today's threats of **climate change, pandemics**, and other nontraditional challenges demand a new and **more integrated, agile, and wholistic approach to U.S. assistance efforts.**

The foreign policy environment has shifted greatly over the last decade. Today's security assistance system emerged in the 9/11 era and was built for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, with a focus on confronting threats from nonstate actors.5 This was encapsulated in the "building partnership capacity" strategy, outlined by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2010, which called for increasing the capabilities of developing states to better police and patrol their neighborhoods and to close off space for insurgent groups.6 U.S. aid was often provided to nondemocratic states or partners that violated human rights but were considered critical partners in the "war on terror." Decisions were viewed as primarily operational, and aid was provided as needed to help partners tackle imminent terrorist or insurgent threats. Almost all U.S. security aid provided year over year is driven by a strategic rationale that is centered on building better counterterrorism partners.

Today, U.S. aid to build up a partner's military should be viewed through the lens of **competition between states**, in addition to the ongoing counterterrorism concerns and state fragility challenges, with much higher stakes for U.S. foreign policy and national interests. This renewed geopolitical competition is at its core an ideological competition between states. China's rise and Russia's resurgence require the United States to realign its foreign policy toward strengthening relations and bolstering democratic states. Security assistance is a tool to do so: It strengthens America's closest partners and fosters closer relationships with other states. When a country accepts U.S. military equipment or enters into a long-term procurement or acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, they are tying their country to the United States. The U.S. decision, for instance, to provide military aid to the United Kingdom through the lend-lease program in the 1940s was not a simple military consideration but a foreign policy consideration with enormous consequences.7 Today, U.S. decisions to provide weapons or support tie American officials to how that support is used—whether they like it or not—as the case of U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen demonstrates.

Moreover, countries that receive U.S. military systems are not just buying equipment off the shelf; they are entering into a longer-term relationship with that country for training, maintenance, and sustainment. This is similar to when a consumer buys a smart phone, as they are not simply buying a piece of hardware; they are reliant on the company to access its broader ecosystem of apps and software and trusting the company to safeguard important data. Over time, a consumer becomes locked in and dependent on a particular provider. Similarly, when a state commits to expanding military-to-military ties—often the most sensitive area for a country—they are making a diplomatic bet on that country. As they base their military on U.S. equipment and U.S. training and engagement, they similarly become locked in to the United States. This sets the ground for more productive American partnerships to tackle a range of geopolitical challenges. For example, U.S. security assistance has been key to building ties with Vietnam after the war between the two countries. American assistance provided to clear unexploded ordnance has helped repair diplomatic relations between Hanoi and Washington, while the recent provision of a retired Coast Guard ship to the Vietnam military can help strengthen military ties and potentially open the door to more U.S. assistance and security cooperation, which will further strengthen bilateral relations.8

There are several reasons that today's security assistance system must change:

• Current security policy decision-making perpetuates the status quo. The current system perpetuates an ineffective status quo, whereby the United States often fails to effectively exert significant diplomatic leverage that it has through security assistance because the bureaucratic structure to administer it—both within the State Department and between the State Department and the DOD—is not designed to advance diplomatic efforts but merely to administer appropriated funds.9 This makes it challenging to change security assistance programs given shifting foreign policy dynamics or changes in a partner's behavior that may make them a less suitable recipient of U.S. security aid, such as democratic backsliding or a pattern of human rights abuses.

• U.S. engagement with partners could be **dominated by military issues** if **foreign officials** turn to **DOD counterparts instead of diplomats** for assistance resources. Because the DOD controls its own security assistance accounts, other foreign policy concerns may get trumped if partners go around the State Department to get aid from the Pentagon. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) worried at a 2017 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that the shift to increasing DOD authorities could "send a fundamental message that the United States considers security relationships over all other U.S. foreign policy objectives or concerns, including human rights or good governance."10 Under the current framework, the State Department's ability to put the brakes on security assistance or military cooperation under DOD authorities is highly limited because the State Department does not control implementation and can often only approve or disapprove of DOD proposals. While State Department officials and ambassadors can and sometimes do halt or temper problematic efforts, doing so requires exerting significant political capital that is in short supply.11 Centralizing control at the State Department would help to fix this bureaucratic imbalance between diplomacy and the Pentagon.

• Defense priorities often **undervalue democratic** and human rights **concerns**. Compared with the State Department, the DOD is less equipped to effectively weigh human rights concerns in its decision-making. This makes it harder to leverage U.S. military cooperation for economic or political concessions or changes that might bolster democratic goals. For example, U.S. military objectives to counter terrorist groups in Somalia called for continuously supplying Uganda with U.S. assistance despite growing human rights and democracy concerns.12 Putting the State Department in charge would make it easier to realign U.S. security assistance toward democratic states and effectively consider human rights issues in every security assistance decision.

• Security assistance in a tense era of great power competition is **extremely sensitive** and can **increase tension** and **lead to miscalculation.** The risk in today's geopolitical environment is that providing sensitive and potentially provocative assistance will **not receive** the same **scrutiny from policymakers** and will become the **norm** for the administering agency, the DOD. In the last era of great power competition, the Cold War, **security assistance** often **stoked tension** between the United States and the Soviet Union and led to **spiraling commitments**. For instance, Soviet provision of nuclear missiles to Cuba led to a nuclear standoff, while U.S. military support for Vietnam led to deepening U.S. engagement.

As competition with China and Russia increases, security assistance could once again prove a major source of tension and cause miscalculation. Providing aid in this environment is not a

mere technical military matter, but ultimately a **political** and **diplomatic concern** that is highly sensitive. Yet today, it is the DOD that is driving assistance to countries such as Ukraine and regions such as Southeast Asia.13 When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the National Security Council became significantly involved in policymaking and limited types of assistance that could be provided, including lethal aid.14 Such unique scrutiny was warranted because there was a crisis involving a U.S. partner and a nuclear-armed state. But the nature of White House intervention was necessary in large part because the security assistance process—for both decision-making and for providing assistance—was broken.

• A military-led response can **overprioritize military engagement** and could **unintentionally steer American engagements into high-risk confrontations.** Without careful calibration and understanding of broader political context, there is real concern that the DOD could get ahead of U.S. policy or **drive it in a more military-centric direction**. For example, China could interpret the DOD's provision of some security assistance through the agency's Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative as an act of aggression if it is not carefully and effectively calibrated against broader political concerns in the region.15 Given the political sensitivies of great power competition, responsibility and oversight for security assistance decisions should **rest with** the agency most in tune with broader U.S. foreign policy concerns and diplomatic developments: **the State Department**.

Reforming security assistance by centralizing it at the State Department would help to elevate the diplomatic considerations of this policy area, while reducing the military-first priorities of the current system that are ill-suited to today's geopolitical challenges.

Generic Solvency – 2NC

Reorganization – 2NC

Planks 2 and 3 specifically solve reorganization.

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Expand and train the security assistance workforce at the State Department

To administer such a massive expansion in security assistance funding, the State Department will need significantly more qualified people focused on this work. The proposed funding shift should involve the State Department **incorporating DOD civilian employees** who currently work on security assistance. This workforce development plan should be a focus of the security assistance structure across the U.S. government, and it should look at where the State Department could detail officials from the DOD as Foggy Bottom ramps up its capacity. The workforce reform should also include the following changes:

• Conduct an overall review of the existing security assistance workforce and make significant reforms to improve the State Department's capacity to manage new resources that are transferred to the department.

• **Hire more employees** charged with overseeing security assistance policy, acknowledging that it will take time to build a robust security assistance workforce.

• Direct resources to **professionalize the security assistance workforce** at the State Department. Similar reforms were mandated for DOD officials working on security cooperation at the Pentagon in 2017.85 Proponents of the changes at the DOD noted that it would "establish a pool of talented and experienced employees from which future senior leaders in security cooperation will be selected, mentored and given an opportunity to guide the enterprise."86 This specialized workforce should extend beyond the DOD so that State Department officials can benefit from established knowledge of the security assistance landscape.

These reforms are critical because without an effective and well-resourced workforce to administer these policy changes at the State Department, the DOD will likely be able to continue to set policy and the terms under which it is implemented due to bigger budgets and manpower at the Pentagon.

Review and reform the State Department's security assistance structure

The State Department will need to reorganize the structure of bureaus involved in security assistance to ensure that relevant offices and personnel are coordinating with each other. Various security assistance programs at the State Department, such as International Narcotics and Law Enforcement or Diplomatic Security's Antiterrorism Assistance, may need to be reorganized under a new structure, such as one centralized security assistance office in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, under one undersecretary. The State Department should restructure the decision-making process to strengthen the role of the Political-Military Affairs

Bureau, granting it more authority over funding decisions and the power to move funds between countries and regions. There should be a clear chain-of-command and decision-making hierarchy in order to enable coherent, consistent decisions on security assistance policy. The reforms should also work to establish effective systems for cross-department and interagency prioritization, planning, and dispute resolution.

In a new system, the offices charged with overseeing security assistance must have **greater authority** to **make decisions** and **move funds** to **regain foreign policy leverage**. As the Political-Military Affairs Bureau increases its relative authority, though, it should be required to offer a clear strategic vision for security assistance and should be held to account to implement this vision. The bureau should also be required to produce an annual report to Congress outlining goals and objectives for U.S. security assistance. For example, if the goal of U.S. foreign policy is to rebalance toward democratic partners, the Political-Military Affairs Bureau should have to show that it is taking steps to meet that goal, such as by moving funds and creating new initiatives that support emerging democracies.

Efficiency – 2NC

Streamlining <u>saves resources</u>.

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

• <u>Centralizing authorities and resources to the State Department would **simplify the interagency process**</u>. As noted above, moving security assistance authorities to the State Department would represent a huge realignment in the interagency process. But this <u>reform</u> effort <u>would align with **long-term broad, bipartisan consensus** that there is a diplomacy-defense imbalance in U.S. foreign policy agencies</u>.21 <u>Realigning assistance resources</u> must be fundamental to any effort to reempower the State Department and <u>would</u> eventually **improve interagency functionality** by <u>resulting in **better-managed policymaking**. The costs of moving authorities would be well worth the improvements in overall U.S. policy by making it **more coherent, less wasteful**, and **more effective**</u>.

AT: DIB DA

Direct defense spending is <u>less efficient</u> than other means – the internal net benefit <u>outweighs</u>.

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

• <u>The U.S. defense industry **would not be damaged by reforms**.</u> Despite the recent insistence of the Trump administration, <u>the objective of U.S. security assistance should not be to support the U.S. defense industrial base</u> or as a jobs program; <u>there are **much more effective ways** of **supporting American jobs**, such as</u> through <u>domestic infrastructure investments, than paying U.S. defense firms to build needless tanks.</u> Unfortunately, this was the outlook for many in the Trump administration. Peter Navarro, the former president's trade adviser, trumpeted that American jobs were sustained by continuing to build tanks for Egypt.22 This jobs claim has been challenged by academic researchers, who found that <u>investments in arms sales **do not create as many new jobs**</u> as other potential investments and **offer underwhelming economic benefits** for Americans.23 <u>Security assistance should instead be viewed primarily as a **diplomatic tool** and thus controlled by diplomats.</u>

But the DIB is screwed <u>regardless</u> – <u>COVID</u> and <u>competition</u>.

Gill 22 [Jaspreet Gill, senior technology reporter for Inside the Army until January 2022; master's degree in magazine, newspaper and online journalism, "The health of the Defense Industrial Base is failing, trade group says," 02/02/22, Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/the-health-of-the-defense-industrial-base-is-failing-trade-group-says/, Accessed: 05/20/22]

WASHINGTON: <u>The health of the defense industrial base</u> has <u>received a **"failing" grade** from a lead defense trade group for the first time</u>, largely <u>due to unprecedented and ongoing challenges created by the COVID-19 pandemic and strategic competition from China and Russia.</u>

That conclusion is part of the National Defense Industrial Association's third annual Vital Signs 2022 report, which offers an analysis of the US's defense industrial base. For this year's report, NDIA and data firm Govini worked together to grade eight "vital signs" that shape the performance of defense contractors, on a 0 to 100 scale, where an average score of 70 is considered passing.

<u>Of the eight categories</u> — demand; production inputs; innovation; supply chain; competition; industrial security; political and regulatory; and productive capacity and surge readiness —**five received a "failing" grade.**

"<u>This past year</u> has <u>witnessed **significant deterioration**</u> in the signs including '<u>supply chain</u>' as well as '<u>production capacity and surge readiness,'</u> which almost certainly is a result of the

impact of the pandemic," according to the report. "Conversely, the only sign that significantly improved was 'demand,' reflecting recent growth in the defense budget."

"Industrial security" continues to be the weakest sign in NDIA report, receiving an overall failing score of 50. The score reflects larger trends in shortcomings of **industrial cybersecurity**, despite increasing resources dedicated to combating the threat, the report states. The number of newly reported common IT cybersecurity vulnerabilities continued to increase.

"Data breaches, intellectual property theft, and state-sponsored industrial espionage in both private companies and university labs are on an unrelenting rise while the dynamic nature of attacks makes it a constantly moving target to address," according to the report.

Industrial security has also been an area of active federal rulemaking, the report states, pointing to the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification as a prime example.

An Interim Rule for CMMC was released in 2020, "prohibiting executive agencies from entering into contracts with any entity that incorporates any equipment or service that uses telecommunication equipment made by Huawei, ZTE, and several other Chinese-made telecommunications equipment manufacturers," according to the report. "CMMC is a DOD effort to improve the handling of sensitive information by and within the defense industrial base . . . These programs are still in interim stages and their impact on cybersecurity is yet to be determined."

Innovation also **remained stagnant** last year, with a decline in investments and a lack of change in the status of scientific research and development services, according to the report. NDIA gave this area a score of 69 for 2021, the same score it received in 2020.

The need for US technological dominance is bolstered by the growing intensity of competition with China and Russia. According to the report, R&D investment has declined precipitously as a percentage of global expenditures. As of 1995 the US ranked fourth in terms of total R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP and by 2019, it dipped to tenth.

"Outside of the private sector, **public sector investment in innovation also continued to deteriorate**," according to the report. "This is especially significant considering that public sector funding dominates the area of basic, experimental and theoretical research in the U.S. Between 2011 and 2016, U.S. government funding for R&D projects fell by 12% in absolute terms. Over the same timeframe, Russia and China grew public investment in R&D by 13% and 56%, respectively."

The outlook for innovation continues to remain bleak: According to the report, companies this year will be required to amortize their R&D expenses over five years as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, amounting to a **significant tax increase**, negatively impacting innovation.

AT: DOD Key – 2NC

DOD would still <u>implement</u> reforms.

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

• Reforming the State Department's security assistance management could improve policy consideration and implementation. <u>Many</u> of the <u>functions involving **DOD security cooperation activities**</u>, such as funding related to exercises and certain training activities, should remain in the Pentagon. Unifying decision-making on **policy**—**not** the details of **implementation**—in the State Department system <u>would</u> also <u>ensure hand-in-glove **cooperation** and **coordination** with the DOD because it is the DOD that, by and large, implements State Department programs. The DOD would</u> therefore <u>continue managing U.S. government security assistance programs even if its programs were folded into the State Department's authorities, as currently is the case with the State Department's FMF program.</u>

BUT reforming DOD alone is <u>insufficient</u>.

Jackson 17 [Rose Jackson, senior policy advisor for the Secure Partnerships Initiative at the Open Society Foundations; served as the chief of staff to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the U.S. Department of State, "Untangling the Web: A Blueprint for Reforming American Security Sector Assistance," 2017, *Open Society Foundations*, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/4fdcaf11-4995-4bcc-b7ba-b522e5a45694/untangling-the-web-20170109.pdf, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Because no one agency or office is responsible for security sector-wide policy, the better-funded programs and agencies often dominate the strategic approach to security challenges abroad. <u>The Defense Department</u> (DoD) is a well-resourced, proactive organization, which means policymakers frequently turn to it to solve problems or respond in time-sensitive contexts. This approach <u>can result in a **military-to-military centric policy**, even in cases where the core security interest of the United States may have more to do with rule of law or policing issues.</u>

The Department of Defense is required by the fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to make major reforms to its security cooperation system, addressing some of the DoD-specific concerns that have arisen. However, <u>reforming DoD and not the State Department</u> or other agencies <u>will **fail to address the most important shortcomings of the current approach**</u> and **risk exacerbating the current lack of policy coherence.** The incoming administration should use the NDAA requirements as the impetus for reforming the system as a whole, with a focus on enabling more objective-driven and well-coordinated policy and programs across the U.S. government.

Specific Solvency – 2NC

General Solvency

Civilian security operations are comparatively more effective for <u>hybrid threats.</u>

Warrick 22 [Thomas S. Warrick, senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former senior official at the Department of State and deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the Department of Homeland Security, "The next National Defense Strategy is coming. These seven points are key to understanding it.," 04/20/22, *Atlantic Council*, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-next-national-defense-strategy-is-coming-these-seven-points-are-key-to-understanding-it/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

2. The forthcoming NDS calls out the "growing kinetic and non-kinetic threats to the United States' homeland from our strategic competitors" and vows to "take necessary actions to increase resilience." What are these threats, and how can the United States increase its resilience to them?

<u>The United States needs to recognize several categories of increasing non-military threats:</u> **cybersecurity** and cyber crime; threats to critical infrastructure from climate change and hostile foreign actors; foreign nation states carrying out mis-, dis-, and mal-information operations; **pandemic disease**; and efforts to sow divisions among the American people. <u>The primary targets of these threats are not the US military</u>—<u>but rather American people and civilian infrastructure.</u> DoD will need to protect the military from these threats and stay ahead of major strategic shifts caused by Russia, China, Iran, and climate change. However, <u>for</u> many of these <u>non-military threats, DoD needs to play a vital **supporting role** to **civilian security efforts**</u>. One of DoD's most important contributions should be a call for more resources and support to civilian security efforts. Then General James Mattis famously said in 2013 that **under-funding the State Department forces DoD to buy more bullets**. <u>Under-investment in diplomacy</u> and development <u>means</u> that <u>the military must do more to make up the shortfall.</u> The same can also be said today about the strategic dangers of under-investing in civilian security. <u>The US military is a powerful instrument of national power</u>—<u>but against</u> many of <u>today's hybrid threats, investing in **civilian security** is **far more cost-effective** and **better defends the American people and infrastructure** from its adversaries.</u>

Diplomacy-focused efforts solve <u>every area.</u>

Blinken 21 [Antony J. Blinken, Secretary Of State, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken on the Modernization of American Diplomacy," 10/27/21, White House Press Release, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-on-the-modernization-of-american-diplomacy/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

First, <u>we will build</u> our <u>capacity and expertise in</u> the <u>areas</u> that will be <u>critical to</u> our <u>national security in the years ahead, particularly</u> climate, **global health, cyber security** and **emerging technologies**, economics, <u>and **multilateral diplomacy**</u>. This isn't just a new list of priorities by a new administration. <u>It reflects a significant reorientation of U.S. foreign policy that focuses on the forces</u> that most directly and consequentially affect Americans' lives, livelihoods, and security, <u>and that will increasingly be at the heart of our alliances</u> and partnerships, and core to our engagement with strategic competitors.

On **cyberspace** and **emerging technologies**, we have a major stake in shaping the digital revolution that's happening around us and making sure that it serves our people, protects our interests, boosts our competitiveness, and upholds our values. We want to prevent cyber attacks that put our people, our networks, companies, and critical infrastructure at risk. We want the internet to remain a transformative force for learning, for connection, for economic growth, not a tool of repression. We want to shape the standards that govern new technology, so they ensure quality, protect consumer health and safety, facilitate trade, respect people's rights. We want to make sure the technology works for democracy, fighting back against disinformation, standing up for internet freedom, reducing the misuse of surveillance technology. And we want to **promote cooperation**, advancing this agenda tech by tech, issue by issue, **with democratic partners** by our side.

All of this is work for **American diplomacy**. After an intense review led by Deputy Secretary Sherman and McKeon that included consultations with partners in Congress and outside experts, I intend, with the support of Congress, to establish a new bureau for cyberspace and digital policy headed by an ambassador-at-large, and to name a new special envoy for critical and emerging technology. Both will report to Deputy Secretary Sherman for at least the first year.

We will also bring more specialized talent, including STEM expertise, to the department, and ensure that we're developing expertise as well in these areas across the Foreign and Civil Service. By taking these steps, we'll be better able to make sure that the United States remains the world's innovation leader and standard setter.

On **global health security**, we're conducting a review to determine how the department can best lead on this issue. Stay tuned for the results there. It's critical that we not only help end the COVID-19 pandemic, but also **build back better global health security** to prevent, to detect, and **mitigate future pandemics**. After the ordeal of the past 21 months, this is an opportunity and a responsibility that we must, and we will, seize.

On climate, President Biden created the position of special presidential envoy for climate, and Secretary Kerry and his team are hard at work integrating climate diplomacy across the department. We've created new Foreign Service positions dedicated full time to climate issues, one in every regional bureau and in critical posts overseas, for example, in India and Brazil. And we'll seek new funding to educate and train officers worldwide on climate diplomacy.

Multilateral diplomacy – well, that's diplo-speak for the need to cooperate with other countries to contend with the greatest challenges of our time, none of which we can tackle effectively alone. If we're not engaged in international institutions, then we leave a void likely to be filled by others who may not share our values and interests, or no one steps up and we squander the benefits of collective action. And wherever and whenever new rules are being debated, for example, on how the global economy should work, how the internet should be governed, how our environment should be protected, how human rights should be defined and defended, American diplomats need to be at the table.

AI Solvency – 2NC

Diplomacy on AI key to arms control efforts.

Blinken 21 [Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence's (NSCAI) Global Emerging Technology Summit," 07/13/21, *US Department of State Office of the Spokesperson Press Releases*, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-national-security-commission-on-artificial-intelligences-nscai-global-emerging-technology-summit/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

We'll launch similar efforts on **AI** and other **emerging technologies**. If they're going to be used as part of our national defense, we want the world to have a shared understanding of how to do that **responsibly**, in the same way that we've hammered out rules for how to use conventional and nuclear weapons. That's how we **reduce** the risk of **proliferation**. It's how we **prevent escalation** or unintended incidents.

Cyber Solvency – 2NC

Specifically, diplomacy is key to <u>cyber-deterrence</u>.

Painter 18 [Chris Painter, globally recognized leader and expert on cyber policy, Cyber Diplomacy and combatting cybercrime "The rise of the internet and cyber technologies constitutes one of the central foreign policy issues of the 21st century.," June 2018, *The Foreign Service Journal*, Accessed: 05/19/22]

Deterrence. The United States has made significant <u>progress in building an international consensus on what constitutes responsible state behavior in cyberspace</u>, but that work <u>is largely irrelevant if there are no consequences for those who violate that consensus.</u> We have not done a very good job of deterring malicious actors—particularly nation-state actors. There are many reasons for this, including difficulties with attribution, a limited stock of potential consequences, and difficulties sharing information among partner countries.

Nevertheless, <u>at the heart of deterrence is the threat of a credible and timely response to the transgressor.</u> Failure to act in a credible or timely way signals to the adversary that their actions are acceptable—or at the very least cost-free. For example, the lack a sufficiently strong, timely and continuing response to Russian interference with our electoral process virtually guarantees that Moscow will attempt to interfere again, both in the United States and in other democratic countries. We must do better.

<u>Diplomacy can and should play a</u> **vital role** <u>in this effort</u>—<u>it is one of the key tools</u> in the tool kit <u>of response options</u> that also include law enforcement actions, economic sanctions and cyber and kinetic responses. <u>We must</u> continue to <u>employ diplomacy effectively and work to enhance all of our existing response options. We must</u> also <u>work with like-minded partners and other stakeholders to develop</u> creative <u>new tools that can be used swiftly and</u> later <u>reversed to change an adversary's behavior</u>—expanding the tool set and communicating, as transparently as possible, the likely costs that will be imposed for bad behavior. And we must enhance collective action.

Although the United States reserves the option to act alone if it must, <u>deterrence and legitimacy are better served when</u> **several countries band together** <u>against a bad actor.</u> There is much diplomatic work to do in forming such an agile coalition of like-minded countries who can call out bad behavior and collectively impose costs on our adversaries. Such a coalition should be flexible and can involve different countries and different actions depending on the actor; but creating it, and solving information sharing and other issues, will require a significant diplomatic effort.

The State Department can actualize cyber stability.

Williams 21 [Brandon Williams, postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, "U.S. and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific," 04/01/21, *Center for Global Security Research*, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/US_and_Allied_Cyber_Security_Cooperation_in_the_Indo-Pacific.pdf, Accessed: 05/17/22]

The workshop's penultimate panel stressed a renewal of innovation in diplomatic practice. An active cyber diplomacy holds the promise of **restoring stability to cyberspace**, and, for the United States, advocating for a free, interoperable, and secure internet globally. State Department retains the **bureaucratic competencies** and **personnel** to enact **forward-looking cyber diplomacy**, but they have much ground to cover on norm construction, capacity building, and affirming that states follow international law in cyberspace. Diplomacy's most substantial roles are protecting an on-line ecosystem where human rights are respected, restoring stability by reducing incentives for states to act maliciously, and demonstrating U.S. leadership in digital rights and emerging technology. Cyber diplomats at the State Department and DHS cooperate with allies on publicly attributing blame for aggressive cyber acts to state-sponsored APTs. State Department is active in the UN's Group of Governmental Experts and Open-Ended Working Group, lobbying for an internet of information freedom rather than information control by states.

Thus far, as one panelist emphasized, the State Department has not yet framed its cyber diplomacy efforts in the realities of the cyber strategic environment. The State Department can make strides in supporting Persistent Engagement by socializing foreign service officers and diplomats, who are the face of diplomacy, to the domain's competitive nature. Shaping international discourse on cybersecurity norms, responsible state behavior, and governance can be best attained by a corps of diplomats who are unified with the United States' cyber doctrine. Norm construction from the bottom up presents the best route to shape global norms. Leveraging agile coalitions of allies to build norms represents a workable solution to adversary intransigence at the UN. Values, by themselves, do not have the power to influence norms against concerted state pressures to assert authoritarian control over the internet.

Diplomacy is key to allied cyber coop.

Blinken 21 [Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence's (NSCAI) Global Emerging Technology Summit," 07/13/21, *US Department of State Office of the Spokesperson Press Releases*, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-national-security-commission-on-artificial-intelligences-nscai-global-emerging-technology-summit/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

So what I'd like to do today is to focus on the State Department's distinct role, because **diplomacy will be critical**.

Working with partners and allies to develop and deploy technology is going to help us tackle the most urgent challenges we face, from pandemics to the climate crisis.

Diplomacy will also be **essential** to mitigating risks, from preventing cyber attacks that target our businesses, to regulating technology that threatens our privacy, to defending our democratic values and way of life.

And let me just pause for a second on that last point, because I think it deserves emphasis. It's fundamentally what's at stake here.

More than anything else, our task is to put forth and carry out a compelling vision for how to use technology in a way that serves our people, protects our interests and upholds our democratic

values. It's not enough to highlight the horrors of techno-authoritarianism, to point to what countries like China and Russia are doing, and say that it's wrong and dangerous, even as it is. We've also got to make the positive case for our own approach, and then we've got to deliver. That is the challenge before us.

We need the United States and we need its partners to remain the world's innovative leaders and standard setters, to ensure that universal rights and democratic values remain at the center of all the innovation that's to come, and that it delivers real benefits in people's lives. That fundamentally is the test that we have to pass, and it's a test I think you've heard President Biden allude to.

In short, democracies have to pass the tech test together. And diplomacy, I believe, has a big role to play in that.

Now, any time you hear someone from the State Department talking, we're likely to throw in pillars and frameworks and tranches, so I can't be any different today. We have to have our pillars, so let me walk you through six of them – (laughter) – that cover the approach to these issues. I know you'd be disappointed without it.

The first is <u>reducing</u> the <u>national security risks posed by malicious cyber activities and emerging technologies.</u>

This <u>is the **most basic thing**</u> our **diplomacy has to do**: <u>protect</u> our <u>people</u>, protect our <u>networks</u>, <u>prevent conflict, and establish standards of responsible conduct in cyberspace.</u>

Already, <u>we've brought countries together around an approach that **recognizes international law**</u> to make it clear that countries are governed in cyberspace just like they are offline and that <u>defines norms that apply not only in wartime but in peacetime too, because we're now dealing with significant cyber incidents outside the context of war.</u>

We've also called for practical confidence-building measures; for example, steps as simple as establishing points of contact, so that in the event of a major cyber incident we actually know who to call. Under American leadership, UN member-states have come together repeatedly to reaffirm this basic framework.

Now <u>we're working to bring **allies** and **partners** along to **respond collectively** when others engage in malicious cyber activity</u>. That's what happened after the SolarWinds intrusion. We attributed it to Russia; 22 countries, the European Union, NATO quickly supported that conclusion. And that's important, because when we speak with one voice, we can more effectively deter future bad acts.

Last month, as some of you will have noted, <u>at the NATO summit, NATO reaffirmed that a cyber attack could trigger Article V</u> – "an attack on one is an attack on all" – <u>and that's an important step</u> too <u>in deterring</u> those <u>attacks and protecting</u> our <u>national security in the cyber age.</u>

Diplomacy ensures sanctions are <u>legitimate</u>.

Ford 22 [The Hon. Christopher Ford, Distinguished Policy Advisor at MITRE Labs and a Visiting Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution; previously served as U.S. Assistant Secretary

of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, "Conceptualizing Cyberspace Security Diplomacy," 05/17/22, *The Cyber Defense Review*, https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/CDR-Content/Articles/Article-View/Article/3034136/conceptualizing-cyberspace-security-diplomacy/, Accessed: 05/19/22]

A less well known but growing component of the West's cyber defense, however, is also diplomatic, in the form of **cyberspace** security **diplomacy**. As exemplified by the U.S. State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (CCI)5] this work involves engaging with foreign counterparts to develop and articulate common understandings of peacetime norms for cyber activity; this includes the principles set forth by United Nations experts in 2013 that states should not attack each other's civilian critical infrastructure in peacetime.[6] It also involves promoting the adoption of common positions in attributing cyberattacks to malicious cyber actors and in imposing penalties (e.g., sanctions, public condemnation, or prosecution) upon those actors.

Cyberspace security diplomacy was responsible for a 2019 agreement reached by 28 Western countries expressing support for the "evolving framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace," supporting "targeted cybersecurity capacity building to ensure that all responsible states can implement this framework and better protect their networks from significant disruptive, destructive, or otherwise destabilizing cyber activity," and pledging to "work together on a voluntary basis to hold states accountable when they act contrary to this framework."[7] It is now not unusual for US officials to impose sanctions upon malicious cyber actors in other countries, nor for US law enforcement agencies to issue criminal indictments.[8] Work by US diplomats, intelligence officials, and law enforcement officers to engage their international counterparts, moreover, has helped encourage foreign governments impose concrete international steps to penalize such malefactors as well.[9]

In the US, such cyber-diplomacy has been undertaken under the aegis of the 2018 National Cyber Strategy, which called for "an international Cyber Deterrence Initiative" that would include building "a coalition [of states] and develop[ing] tailored strategies to ensure adversaries understand the consequences of their own malicious cyber behavior."

> The United States will work with like-minded states to coordinate and support each other's responses to significant malicious cyber incidents, including through intelligence sharing, buttressing of attribution claims, public statements of support for responsive actions taken, and joint imposition of consequences against malign actors.[10]

Such diplomacy cannot solve all today's problems of rampant cybercrime and state-sponsored cyber assaults, of course, but it **is a key piece of the puzzle** as Western societies build effective responses.

Biotech Solvency – 2NC

State department funding is key to biological nonproliferation.

State 22 [State Department, US government agency, "Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations Appendix 2," 2022, *US Department of State*, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/FY-2023-Congressional-Budget-Justifcation-Appendix-2-final-5-9-2022.pdf, Accessed: 05/17/22]

FY 2023 <u>funding will</u> also <u>support an urgent priority to</u> **develop** and **improve foreign partner policy** and **enforcement procedures** to address **high consequence pathogens**, biological agents of concern, and chemical security threats. To that end, EXBS has expanded specialized training for customs and border enforcement officials at land, air, and maritime points of entry to improve identification and mitigation of the spread of chemical and biological threats. <u>EXBS will leverage funds to</u> continue these activities and <u>improve interagency and multilateral information-sharing among partners.</u> EXBS will <u>support foreign partner governments' increased outreach to industry, academic, and private sectors on biotechnology, materials, equipment, related intangible technology, and data protection that have applications in</u> potential chemical and <u>biological weapons and delivery system proliferation.</u> In addition, <u>EXBS will engage biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and relevant emerging technology industries to prevent diversion of WMD-applicable materials.</u>

Specifically in the context of NATO.

State 22 [State Department, US government agency, "Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations Appendix 2," 2022, *US Department of State*, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/FY-2023-Congressional-Budget-Justifcation-Appendix-2-final-5-9-2022.pdf, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Strengthening and Modernizing the Transatlantic Alliance to Confront Shared Current and Future Threats, While Sharing Responsibilities Equitably

Russia's war against Ukraine and other <u>evolving global threats requires the United States to</u> **reaffirm**, <u>invest in, and modernize</u> **NATO**, along with other global and European alliances and partnerships. <u>Threats</u>, whether through conventional or hybrid means, originate from Russia, the PRC, Iran, and other state and non-state actors. The dangers they pose <u>demand transatlantic cooperation on innovation to improve resilience, enable early detection, build deterrence, and provide rapid response. The United States will join its Allies and partners</u> in working to deter Russian military aggression and expansion, resolve existing areas of Russian occupation, and strengthen sovereignty and territorial integrity. Similarly, the United States will work with its partner countries <u>to</u> **address** the **weaknesses in global health security planning, systems, and capabilities, to ensure improvements in early prevention, detection, containment, and response to the spread of infectious diseases.** The United States will support a joint accelerated approach to address the climate crisis, including through mitigation and adaptation efforts, and cooperation on the Arctic. The U.S. Government will use diplomatic, public diplomacy, and foreign assistance resources to contribute to joint efforts with Allies and partners to respond effectively to global threats such as violent extremism and terrorism, the COVID-19 pandemic, and climate change. U.S assistance will focus on enhancing NATO

interoperability and security cooperation by helping our partners build their military capabilities and contribute to the Alliance in an equitable manner while enhancing our partners' comparative advantages to address these threats.

NATO-Specific UQ – 2NC

In the context of NATO operations, foreign policy is problematically <u>military-focused</u>.

McCarthy 19 [Deborah A. McCarthy, Visiting Senior Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, "The militarization of US foreign policy: Engagement with Europe increasingly about defense," 2019, *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/comment13_militarization-of-us-foreign-policy.pdf, Accessed: 05/17/22]

<u>In 2009, the Department's international mandate broadened to "strengthening governance and the rule of law and fostering economic stability and development". Congress added new authorities, most recently allowing the US military to work with non-military security forces. The Defense Department now manages a greater portion of security assistance than the Department of State. The Trump Administration continues to favor the use of the US military over US diplomacy to address great-power competition. It has increased the defense budget while slashing that for diplomacy; for 2020, it requested a 4.9% increase for the Defense Department and proposed a 21% cut for the State Department</u>. Today,<u> the Department of Defense</u> plays an important <u>role in US foreign policy</u>.

This expanded role <u>is visible in Europe.</u> Despite tirades by President Donald Trump on the value of NATO, and finger-pointing on member contributions, <u>US military engagement with NATO</u> and in Europe <u>continues</u>, with broad Congressional and public support. Through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), <u>the US military</u> has <u>increased its forward presence and exercises with allies and partners.</u> Through Operation Atlantic Resolve, the US European Command added US troop rotations across Eastern Europe and prepositioned equipment. The Defense Department also boosted training and assistance for Georgia and Ukraine. The increased US military presence in Europe was triggered by Russia's invasion of Crimea and aimed at reassuring allies along Europe's eastern frontier. Today, it is part of a broader US and NATO deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia.

The Defense Department has become involved in institution-building in the region, normally the purview of diplomacy. Examples include repairing schools, conducting anti-corruption workshops, and law enforcement training. The <u>gray zone challenges in Europe, especially cyber and disinformation, are being addressed primarily by the Defense Department.</u> Whereas the State Department eliminated the office of the Cyber Coordinator, the Defense Department broadened its networks and now includes civilian authorities in exercises. Whereas **the State Department has very little funding to fight Russian disinformation**, the Defense Department is **expanding initiatives** within EUCOM and with <u>NATO</u>.

The consequences of the increased militarization of US foreign policy for transatlantic relations are threefold.

First, <u>US engagement in Europe **appears more militarized**. The addition of US forces and</u> the <u>increased tempo of exercises has meant</u> that <u>tens of thousands of US troops</u> have <u>moved across Europe visible to all civilians.</u> A publicity campaign has been waged to highlight this

commitment. New security agreements are being signed and celebrated, including the new letter on security cooperation between the US, Finland and Sweden. The increased US pressure on burden sharing, although not always well received, has meant even more defense discussions.

In contrast, US **diplomatic engagement** has **decreased**. President Trump's negative rhetoric about Europe, the decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement and the Iran Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA), and friction on issues such as Nord Stream II have **disrupted normal diplomatic discourse**. There have been n**o US-EU Summits** since President Trump took office and subgroups on energy and cyber have not met in several years.

Secondly, joint efforts to address threats to democracy in the region will likely be carried out or funded by the Defense Department**. The State Department simply does not have the resources**: for 2018, its budget for all of Europe and Eurasia was $1.2 billion. The budget for EDI alone was $4.5 billion.

Thirdly, beyond Europe, US-European cooperation is more likely to advance in **military rather than in policy channels.** On China, for example, where policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are unable to agree on a comprehensive approach, defense officials are working together to address China's new military muscle in forums such as the US France Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue. In Africa, where US and EU policymakers have vastly different strategies, military cooperation continues to fight terrorism, crime and human trafficking.

The enhanced position of the Defense Department in US foreign policy is likely to continue. The US military **has not sought this role.** Indeed, US military leaders have **repeatedly called** for restoring **balance between** the use of **military** and **diplomatic tools** and for **funding the State Department.** Despite these appeals, the Trump Administration's preference for using the US military will further increase the militarization of US foreign policy.

INB

INB UQ – 2NC

Recent reforms <u>don't solve</u> – permutations are <u>tweaking</u>.

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

<u>Recent efforts to reform</u> the <u>security assistance</u> architecture tend to <u>get bogged down by the complexity of the current system. This</u> has <u>led to an inevitable focus on **incremental tweaks**</u> that address tactical-level concerns. <u>These</u> weedy <u>discussions</u>, while useful, often <u>take the current structure of the U.S. security assistance system as a given</u>—<u>and</u> therefore, <u>do not address the broader</u> strategic and budgetary <u>issues and **imbalance** between **diplomacy** and **defense**</u>. Furthermore, <u>policymakers</u> and politicians often **get lost in the technical nature of** these **discussions**, lack broader historical context, <u>and are **easily persuaded**</u> by officials with a stake in largely **preserving the status quo** and in **protecting their offices**, who tout the complexity of the challenge; as a result, <u>they quickly lose interest in reform.</u> A new administration should be wary of these past mistakes when embarking on suggested reforms in this report.

Obama administration efforts attempted to improve interagency cooperation

During the first years of <u>the Obama administration</u>, White House officials led an interagency review of U.S. security assistance policy. The result, Presidential Policy Directive 23, established goals and policy guidelines for U.S. security assistance in 2013 and <u>sought to increase</u> interagency, meaning <u>State Department-DOD, collaboration.</u>51 <u>But there were challenges in implementing these reforms.</u> For example, <u>the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)</u> was created under the Obama administration as an experimental program designed as a joint effort, housed at the State Department with staff from both agencies and new funds to pool resources.52 But the GSCF <u>turned out to be bureaucratically unwieldy and ultimately unsuccessful</u>: Because it was housed at the State Department and the DOD, eight congressional committees exerted oversight, and <u>projects were easily stymied by skeptical staffers.</u>53 <u>It</u> also <u>lacked institutional buy-in from the DOD, which was slow to provide staff and resources and focused on working around the State Department instead.</u>

Congressional efforts have primarily focused on the DOD's resources

Rather than concentrate on the overall security assistance landscape, <u>congressional reform efforts focused</u> entirely <u>on consolidating DOD authorities and bridging silos within the existing system.</u> For example, the fiscal year 2017 NDAA sought to institutionalize DOD assistance by merging many of the Pentagon's authorities into a "new, broader global train and equip authority," creating a new Section 333 under the DOD's Title 10 authority.54 But Section 333 is essentially redundant to many of the State Department's authorities, including FMF; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs. And while the authorization calls for the <u>"concurrence" of the secretary of state, in practice</u>, it <u>leaves the State Department with very little leverage and little ability to shape DOD programs.</u> Some analysts found, "There are varying degrees of Section 333

implementation and buy-in from combatant command leadership," with some viewing the State Department-DOD integration as a check-the-box exercise.55

While there have been some notable attempts, such as 2019's Department of State Authorization Act in the House of Representatives,56 Congress has failed to enact any major legislation to modernize State Department authorities or resources. Moreover, these **reforms** to the DOD's security assistance authorities **did nothing to improve the State Department's authorities**; though Section 333 included reporting requirements that are considered a "gold standard" for assessing a partner's capacity to absorb U.S. assistance, such assessments are not required for assistance from the State Department.57

Trump administration changes have exacerbated the problem

Meanwhile, Trump administration efforts have only further exacerbated the growing imbalance between the DOD and the State Department. President Donald Trump proposed significant foreign aid cuts in each budget, which would significantly strain already limited State Department resources. For example, the president's 2020 budget proposed a 5 percent increase for DOD security assistance while advocating an 18 percent cut to State Department programs.58 The president's first budget in 2017 went even further and proposed cuts of 51 percent for peacekeeping and 32 percent for narcotics and law enforcement accounts, while proposing a $54 billion bump in total DOD funds.59 Trump also proposed shifting FMF program from grants to loans, suggesting partners could purchase American equipment with U.S. assistance "on a repayable basis."60 Another proposal from the Trump administration would have reduced the State Department's flexibility even further, directing 95 percent of FMF to just four recipients and leaving 5 percent for the rest of the world.61 These changes—which have not ultimately taken effect or been pursued by the Congress—would have left the State Department with even fewer resources to effectively and flexibly respond to American partners and changing security needs.

Democracy INB – 2NC

Successful democratic aid cushions transitions, <u>solving global war</u>.

Savun & Tirone 11 [Burcu Savun and Daniel C. Tirone, * Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, "Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?," 2011, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 55, Issue 2, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00501.x]

The virtues of democratic regimes have been long praised in academic and policy circles alike. However, the path to democracy may not be an easy one. Democratization is likely to increase the uncertainty domestic actors have regarding the intentions of others and thereby weaken the credibility of commitments made. In such environments, the risk of domestic political violence increases. We argue that <u>democracy assistance programs can **help democratizing countries cushion**</u> this **risk** <u>by improving democratic governance and providing</u> **external** validation of **commitments** and promises <u>made during the transition. The empirical evidence is consistent with our argument: democratizing countries that receive high levels of democracy aid are **less likely to experience civil conflic**t</u> <u>than those that receive little or no democracy aid.</u>

Unfortunately, the <u>existing literature fails to consider</u> such <u>potential</u> positive <u>roles of democracy assistance programs.</u> The main focus of the literature has been on the direct involvement of international and regional organizations in democratic transitions (e.g., Hawkins 2008; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Pevehouse 2005). For example, Pevehouse (2005) suggests that external reassurances by regional organizations provide a crucial inducement during early phases of the regime transition (22). However, he acknowledges that it is not costless for regional organizations to undertake this task, and there are certain conditions under which regional organizations can make a difference. We argue that although <u>democracy assistance programs</u> may not be a perfect substitute for regional organizations, they can act as a <u>complement</u> or a less expensive alternative to the <u>legitimization and validation</u> functions <u>of regional organizations in their efforts to smoothen</u> the thorny aspects of the <u>democratization</u> process.

Our findings also shed some light on the debate on <u>the "dark side of democratization."</u> Mansfield and Snyder's thesis <u>has been rebutted on methodological grounds</u>. However, there may also be theoretical reasons as to why democratization does not sometimes lead to war. For example, some <u>democratizing countries</u> receive external assistance while others do not. In this article, we provide evidence that the former group <u>is less vulnerable to conflict</u> than the latter <u>as democracy aid helps these countries better address commitment problems during the early phases of democratization.</u>

Militarized security assistance ensures democratization <u>backfires</u>.

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Harms democratic progress and enables human rights violators

Current security assistance policy, divorced from other foreign aid considerations, hampers pursuing this values-based policy and does not effectively elevate human rights and democracy concerns in the decision-making process. This is dangerous because the United States ends up **supporting autocratic regimes** with **serious governance** and **stability challenges**. Yemen, for example, received more than $300 million in security assistance through the DOD's train and equip authority between 2010 and 2015, yet researchers documented human rights abuses perpetrated by the government and possible diversion of U.S. aid.67 Worse still, the perception that U.S. aid was fueling conflict led much of the Yemeni public to believe that the United States was primarily responsible for the destruction of the Saudi-led coalition in the current war.68 Today, the conflict in Yemen is the world's worst humanitarian crisis.

An overly militarized security assistance policy makes it **harder to support emerging democracies**. Building up security forces without accompanying reforms to strengthen civilian oversight can lead to **coup-proofing** or **consolidation** around a political leader, rather than the development of a competent force.69 Often, these impacts are **not prioritized** by security assistance practitioners; for example, the DOD's relative spending on building up partner security institutions, such as the Defense Institution Reform Initiative, was $32.6 million in fiscal year 2019, compared with $1.9 billion of overall spending.70 At the same time, the DOD's investment in institutional capacity building far exceeds the State Department's investment in these efforts—an example where the State Department will have to incorporate and improve on the DOD's practices.

While U.S. laws technically prohibit providing security assistance to units found to violate human rights—the Leahy laws—the provisions are **riddled with loopholes** and are **too weak to effectively prioritize human rights** in U.S. security assistance.71 Offices and agencies responsible for elevating human rights in U.S. foreign policy, such as the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, are too often cut out of the decision-making process for security assistance programs—especially those run out of the Pentagon. At the same time, the Pentagon maintains its own security assistance accounts, such as Section 127e, that are not required to conduct human rights vetting and operate with little transparency—furthering opportunities to militarize foreign policy.72 And often, such as in the case of Egypt, security assistance is accompanied by paltry amounts of democracy, human rights, and governance funding (DRG), or certifications on human rights are waived entirely, to make providing arms more palatable.73 These small DRG funds or certification stops do little to change the underlying political challenges or are sometimes even hampered by the regime the United States is funding.

The counterplan realigns security assistance and guarantees democratic investment.
Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Realign security assistance so that it supports more democratic states and more closely aligns with U.S. democratic values

U.S. security assistance—funded by American taxpayers—should rarely, if ever, go to authoritarian regimes. Instead, future security assistance should be realigned to support established democracies and growing democratic efforts. Reducing U.S. security assistance to an authoritarian state will likely be a difficult process and at times require short-term tangible trade-offs, such as military access or overflight rights, with a less tangible long-term goal of rebuilding America's moral authority and boosting incentives for states to remain, or become, democratic. Yet, as history has shown, these trade-offs are often not worth the short boost in relations at the longer-term cost in stability and good governance practices. This realignment process can only be accomplished and overseen by the State Department, as the DOD is not equipped to decide trade-offs involving nonmilitary or security needs.

There may be exceptions or cases where, despite the objective of realigning, foreign policy interests on strengthening military ties take precedence. One example may be Vietnam, where the United States worked hard to build relations in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and in response to China's rise, and security aid was accompanied by health and development assistance. But providing U.S. security assistance to nondemocracies when called for could and should demand additional strings and additional nonsecurity aid.91 In the case of counterterrorism assistance to partners with bad rights records, for example, security assistance needs to be accompanied by increased funding for democracy, rights, and governance to help strengthen civil society and improve election monitoring capacity. If governments do not support or welcome U.S. assistance toward governance and democracy initiatives, security assistance packages should be vetted and reassessed, with an inclination toward realigning funding for nondemocratic states. Centralizing security assistance in the State Department would make it easier for diplomats to track these political factors and make the call to approve or cut off U.S. aid.

Miscalc INB – 2NC

Militarization risks <u>great power conflict</u>.

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Contributes to the militarization of foreign policy

<u>The current security assistance system contributes to the **militarization of U.S. foreign policy**. Militarizing foreign policy entails the increasing use of the military to solve foreign policy challenges and results in a **bloated DOD budget** with **more resources** and **authority**.</u> Researchers describe it as a phenomenon whereby "<u>the military more and more becomes the primary actor and face of U.S. policy abroad</u>," <u>leading to a cycle in which the DOD requires and receives significantly more resources than any other foreign policy agency and is</u> thus <u>increasingly relied on to solve U.S. foreign policy problems.</u>62 <u>There are several elements of a militarized foreign policy in today's security assistance</u> system, <u>but primarily, the DOD's control of significantly more security assistance resources puts the Pentagon</u>—<u>rather than diplomats</u>—<u>in the driver's seat in policymaking.</u>

<u>The Pentagon's significant resources</u> also **<u>distort</u>** <u>the face of **U.S. security assistance on the ground**</u>. Gordon Adams, a former White House budget official, warned, "Who owns the ball matters here because it colors the way the U.S. engages overseas. <u>If American engagement wears a uniform</u> … <u>that's one form of interaction. If it involves the ambassador</u> and the [U.S. Agency for International Development] and people doing governance work, <u>it's a different set of missions and **there's a hugely different perception**</u>."63 Recipient countries can utilize this to their advantage; foreign officials may more eagerly seek to follow through or make progress on DOD requests or priorities, such as going through with a significant military exercise or a ship visit, while ignoring or slow-rolling State Department requests or priorities, such as releasing a dissident or altering an economic regulation. And <u>if the interlocutor that matters in relations with the United States is the military, the subject that matters is defense.</u> The Pentagon's priorities can therefore end up carrying more importance with partners than the State Department's broader foreign policy concerns, making combatant commands more powerful than any diplomat. <u>When the State Department is deprived of resources, or cut out of the decision-making process</u> entirely, **<u>diplomats cannot effectively weigh in</u>** on whether a proposed sale or package makes sense given a range of other nonmilitary concerns that may exist in a bilateral relationship. In short, <u>money is power, and the DOD has the money.</u>

<u>The net effect is that **U.S. foreign policy is less coherent,** with Pentagon policy more likely to be out of sync with broader foreign policy concerns.</u> For example, <u>the DOD's U.S. Africa Command posture review is</u> being <u>conducted with</u> little to <u>no coordination with the State Department, and the rumored outcome is to call for reduced U.S. presence and security investments in order to free up DOD resources to focus on competition with Russia and China.</u>64 Yet <u>the United States still has serious security and geopolitical interests in the continent that are likely not reflected in</u>

traditional military-only decision-making. Rachel Stohl, managing director at the Stimson Center, warned that developing military-to-military security assistance programs is "an important relationship, one that should be cultivated, but it is not separate from the diplomatic and foreign policy relationships that have to be developed and take time. If you lose the foreign policy piece and just focus on the security piece, you're doing a disservice to the larger strategic objectives."65 The siloed security assistance system leads to disjointed U.S. foreign policy, divorces security concerns from broader economic or diplomatic concerns, and can end up promoting militarized solutions.

Perm – 2NC

Perm Do Both – 2NC

Perm do both <u>links to the net benefit</u> –

Duplicative enforcement is militarized and dysfunctional.

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Contributes to an inefficient bureaucracy and coordination nightmare

Because of the patchwork of existing authorities to provide security assistance, there are multiple systems for U.S. officials in Washington and on the ground in embassies to manage. For the security assistance system to work effectively, U.S. officials at the State Department, the Pentagon, and in the field need to closely coordinate—but this does not always happen in the current structure. Military officers conducting and implementing security assistance have to juggle multiple security assistance programs with different types of reporting requirements, human rights vetting standards, and administrative barriers, while also being beholden to two chains of command—the ambassador and the combatant command—with sometimes divergent perspectives.

Many programs are supposed to be dual key and require signoff from both the secretary of defense and secretary of state. But because the DOD owns the authority, their control over the direction of the program exceeds the State Department's capacity and available political influence to shape programs. A Congressional Research Service report found that in practice, "many more projects are submitted by the Combatant Commands than by embassy staff."78 The resource imbalance between the DOD and the State Department also affects coordination; for example, State Department officials usually only see planned Section 333 activities when the DOD transmits a hefty tranche of proposals for a 14-day concurrence—hardly a joint planning process.79 This leaves the State Department in a position where, if it cannot persuade the DOD of the merits of any particular concerns, it must either sign off on the package or risk an interagency battle over one minor piece of it. Doing the latter not only puts the State Department in a very tough bureaucratic position vis-a-vis the DOD, but it can also be hard to convince a secretary of state that the objection is worth the battle with their DOD counterpart. This suggests that DOD programs, even if dual key, are likely to reflect military considerations and priorities, regardless of intentions.

Moreover, due to personnel and resource shortages, former U.S. officials found that the State Department is "not equipped to coordinate across the increasingly complex and unwieldy" security assistance system.80 Senior policymakers, who often lack adequate staff or extensive training on security assistance, are not well equipped to effectively guide the bureaucracy on who should receive security assistance and how it fits into broader foreign policy decision-making.81 The State Department's lack of resources also naturally hampers dual-key provisions that seek to fix coordination gaps between the State Department and the DOD. This leads to a system where security assistance policy varies country by country, depending on the personnel

in place and the agency that takes charge. The added bureaucracy can make efficient, cost-conscious decisions impossible, and it opens the process up to political influence.

The DOD will <u>circumvent diplomats</u> given the <u>slightest inch</u>.

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

• <u>DOD officials can **work around**</u> the **State Department**'s **diplomats**. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and with new programs at the DOD, <u>Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs than their State Department counterparts. The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to</u> sudden emergencies or new <u>crises, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, **making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.**</u>44 Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.45 <u>A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department</u>.46

"Security cooperation" necessarily includes <u>military-led negotiations</u>.

Fenell 11 [Nathan L. Fenell, EdD Educational Leadership and Administration, M.A. International/Global Studies, "Security Cooperation Poorly Defined," 2011, Master's Thesis, https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=thes, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Abbot, Grossman, Meese, and Rosenwaser materially contribute to the topic of **security cooperation** via their discussion of interagency cooperation. These authors believe that security cooperation was necessary to achieve success in developing and executing United States foreign policy. The authors recognize that the United States <u>will</u> typically **place the burden of diplomacy on the military** and **expect the Department of Defense to craft interagency solutions** that <u>involve other government agencies</u> to create political and social stability within a proscribed area.100 Unfortunately like Rietjens and Menkhaus, these authors frame the need to develop an efficient and effective interagency process in the backdrop of post conflict operations.101 In situating the need for interagency cooperation as a result of the post-conflict, reconstruction environment the implication is that interagency cooperation is most needed at the conclusion of armed conflict. Abbot and his co-authors frame his argument in the following way; the complex nature of capacity building in a post conflict environment requires that the Department of Defense invest in the education of its officer corps. The specific point made is that officers should be trained as experts in an assigned geographic region and then stationed and employed in such a way as to maintain the officer's regional cultural expertise. Abbot is not suggesting a revamp of the current Regional Area Officer program that results in careers that cap out as a Colonel. Instead he is recommending that the Department of Defense create command

opportunities for the regional experts that enable them to reach the rank of General and use their cultural knowledge and political influence as a General to support security cooperation strategies and improve international relationships between the United States and other foreign governments.102

Perm Do the CP

Perm do the counterplan severs <u>security cooperation</u>:

That's <u>DOD-specific</u>, while the counterplan has the State Department implement <u>security assistance</u>.

Kerr 18 [Alexandra Kerr, program coordinator of CFR's International Institutions and Global Governance program, "Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context," 2018, *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, Vol. 17, Issue 3, https://connections-qj.org/article/defense-institution-building-us-context, Accessed: 05/18/22]

Finally, in the U.S. government, "security cooperation" and "security assistance"—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—are overlapping but not necessarily interchangeable. <u>The distinction between</u> **"security cooperation"** <u>and</u> **"security assistance"** activities <u>has to do with the</u> **agency** administering the program: in simplest terms, <u>it is either an</u> **activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance).**

Security assistance distinct from security cooperation includes programs <u>administered by State</u> and <u>enforced by DOD</u>.

White 14 [Major Taylor P. White, USMC, Joint Doctrine Development Officer with the Joint Staff J7, "Security Cooperation: How It All Fits," 2014, *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol. 72, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-72/jfq-72_106-108_White.pdf?ver=2014-03-13-152407-220, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Having addressed the larger constructs, it is possible to review and clarify the relationships between other programs and activities that occur within them. First is <u>security assistance</u> with a specific definition in relation to both DOD and State. It <u>refers to</u> a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. These <u>programs</u> are **funded and authorized by State** to be **administered by DOD** through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.6 <u>This is the process by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services. That portion of</u> **security assistance outside of security cooperation** in figure 1 <u>reflects</u> **State and other civilian agency involvement.**

Security Cooperation Framework

Government definitions <u>agree</u>.

Van Eerden 20 [James R. R. Van Eerden, recently graduated from the Expeditionary Warfare School, Marine Corps University; currently works with the National Security Agency filling a variety of positions: deputy director, chief operations officer, and Marine detachment officer-in-charge, "Seeking Alpha in the Security Cooperation Enterprise: A New Approach to Assessments and Evaluations," 2020, *Journal of Advanced Military Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/796246/pdf, Accessed: 05/17/22]

<u>Security Cooperation, Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, provides the following definition of security cooperation:</u>

> <u>Security cooperation</u> (SC) <u>encompasses all</u> **Department of Defense** (DOD) interactions, **programs**, <u>and activities with foreign security forces</u> (FSF) <u>and</u> their <u>institutions to build relationships that</u> help <u>promote U.S. interests</u>; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the U.S. access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with U.S. defense objectives.5

Security cooperation <u>isn't all-encompassing</u>.

White 14 [Major Taylor P. White, USMC, Joint Doctrine Development Officer with the Joint Staff J7, "Security Cooperation: How It All Fits," 2014, *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol. 72,

Security cooperation is referred to in both joint professional military education programs and joint staffs as a tool to be employed by combatant commands. However, in other settings, it is a set of programs managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Extensive review of joint doctrine and policy reveals that the definition of security cooperation appears to encompass these areas and more. After expanding our understanding of security cooperation, other terms such as security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security assistance provide additional specificity for the tasks being conducted, yet **some of these actions fall outside security cooperation.** Even though **security cooperation** spans the range of military operations and is inclusive of large-scale operations conducted in support of foreign nations, it **is not all-encompassing of security related support from U.S. agencies other than DOD.**

Nation assistance is support rendered by foreign forces within another nation's territory based on mutual agreements.1 While this term is used to describe the comprehensive approach to assisting other nations, the definition associated with nation assistance has two limitations: it does not encompass support to regional organizations, and it is only assistance by foreign forces. A better, broader term is foreign assistance, which is assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters.2 When examining the current definitions for foreign assistance and nation assistance, we find significant overlap:

> Foreign assistance to foreign nations [ranges] from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. U.S. foreign assistance takes three forms: development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.3

This term is likely to resonate with the **State Department**, which has an Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance and a designated foreign assistance budget.

Nation assistance—assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.4 The term nation assistance is not often used in policy or strategy. For example, the current National Security Strategy mentions foreign assistance three times but does not use the term nation assistance. The first opportunity to create some clarity is to replace the term nation assistance with foreign assistance in the upcoming revisions of JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

If foreign assistance were to replace nation assistance in joint doctrine, the definition would include that portion of security cooperation that falls outside the realm of nation assistance in figure 1. Foreign assistance then encompasses all of security cooperation and reduces some of the ambiguity. Security cooperation then focuses **strictly on the DOD contribution to foreign assistance** and encompasses **all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build** both national and regional **defense relationships** that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.5

AFF

AFF – Solvency Deficits

Delay – 2AC

Counterplan is <u>slow</u>

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

• The State Department must be scaled up in order to gain the capacity to absorb the DOD's programs. <u>Moving the DOD's vast assistance budget to the State Department would be one of the most significant realignments of the U.S. national security agencies since the formation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2002.</u> Such a <u>bureaucratic change will</u> require real reform and a significant expansion in the State Department's capacity to manage and administer the substantial increase in resources, as well as <u>demand **significant internal reform** and **reorganization**</u>. To be clear, **<u>State Department bureaucracy has</u>** often **<u>been its own biggest enemy</u>**; it is beset by **<u>turf battles, inefficiency, lack of clear and timely decision-making</u>**, and **<u>tangled lines of authority</u>**. As it currently stands, <u>the State Department is **far from capable** of taking on the role this report suggests.</u> However, these barriers should become the impetus for reform, not excuses to favor the status quo. Indeed, these efforts should be undertaken with other necessary reforms at the State Department to rebuild and improve U.S. diplomatic capacity.

Planning – 2AC

Only the DOD has a cohesive doctrine to outline the goals of security cooperation.

- USG = US Government

Zaccor 5 [Colonel Albert Zaccor, Director for Southern Europe in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy – NATO/Europe, "Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy," 2005, *The Atlantic Council of the United States*, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005_08_Security_Cooperation_and_Non-State_Threats.pdf, Accessed 05/17/22]

Part III of this paper offered a definition of Security Cooperation that could be common to the entire USG, not just the Department of Defense. The USG interagency has **no** such **common definition** because it lacks a common conceptual understanding of how to translate higher level strategic guidance into specific programs designed to accomplish strategic objectives.

The Department of Defense, despite its size, its diversity, and the scope of its Security Cooperation activities, **has such a common understanding.** DOD's process is not without its flaws.113 During the late 1990s and the early 21st century, however, the department has successfully established a rational set of procedures for translating the strategic guidance in the National Security, Military, and, now, Defense Strategies, into specific programs executed by the military commands, services, and defense agencies.114 This process **promotes discipline** by forcing subordinate organizations to demonstrate that their Security Cooperation activities **directly support specific objectives** in the higher-level strategies. Efforts are under way to discipline the process further by **establishing an assessment mechanism** to provide feedback on the effectiveness of programs and activities.115 One reason for the success of the DOD program is OSD's publication of periodic Security Cooperation Guidance. This document, in addition to providing authority for subordinate organizations' Security Cooperation activities (see more below), serves the purpose of an informal doctrine, stipulating not only the "what," but the "how" and the "why" of Security Cooperation.116

State Department Bad – 2AC

Blinken is incompetent

Pavlich 22 [Katie Pavlich, editor for Townhall.com and a Fox News contributor, "Pavlich: Blinken's diplomatic failure," 03/02/22, *The Hill*, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/596428-pavlich-blinkens-diplomatic-failure/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Those words served as a warning, and eight years later, <u>Secretary of State Antony Blinken has proven true McCain's assertions about his capabilities to launch America and its allies into a more dangerous world.</u>

<u>With the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine</u> marking Europe's first major land war in decades, <u>just six months after the catastrophic and chaotic exit from Afghanistan, Blinken is</u> **clearly incapable**. His **diplomatic efforts** have **repeatedly failed** in **spectacular fashion**. While Russian President Vladimir <u>Putin's actions to invade a sovereign country are his own, a failure to deter the situation through aggressive diplomacy and proper, prioritized deployment of U.S. policy, is **Blinken's responsibility**.</u>

<u>For weeks the State Department warned of a Russian invasion while claiming the door to diplomacy and lines of communication were still open.</u> Out of caution, <u>Blinken moved State Department personnel out of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, insisting it wasn't a retreat and that talks were ongoing.</u>

On Feb. 22, 2022, Putin announced he was sending "peacekeepers" into eastern Ukraine. Shortly afterward, bombs started dropping over Ukraine, marking the failure of U.S. State Department diplomacy with Blinken at the helm. Making matters worse, <u>Blinken **emboldened Putin**</u> on his way into the crisis <u>by focusing on the **wrong priorities**.</u>

<u>For over a year the State Department</u> has <u>engaged in a large-scale campaign to hinder domestic U.S. energy production</u> in order <u>to appease</u> largely <u>worthless and expensive global climate pacts.</u>

"As Secretary of State, my job is to make sure our foreign policy delivers for the American people — by taking on the biggest challenges they face and seizing the biggest opportunities that can improve their lives. No challenge more clearly captures the two sides of this coin than climate," Blinken said during remarks in April 2021, just a few months into the new administration. "We'll put the climate crisis at the center of our foreign policy and national security, as President Biden instructed us to do in his first week in office. That means taking into account how every bilateral and multilateral engagement — every policy decision — will impact our goal of putting the world on a safer, more sustainable path."

<u>While the U.S.</u> has <u>cut its own domestic production and exports, it increased the amount of oil imported from Russia in 2021. The Europeans</u>, who easily convinced President Biden and Secretary Blinken to rejoin the Paris climate agreement, <u>furthered Russia's dominance over the continent by jumping on board with Nord Stream</u> 2. <u>The U.S. and Europe still need oil and gas, but to satisfy self-imposed virtue signaling emissions standards, they're buying it from hostile</u>

countries and funding war crimes. Putin is happy to sell oil that fuels his interests, especially to naive and academically driven Westerners willing to kneecap themselves along the way.

A l**ack of pressure on NATO countries** to pay their committed shares to the alliance, on top of engaging in climate change alarmism and self-inflicted energy outsourcing to hostile actors, is **fueling Putin's war** against innocent Ukrainians. The European Union and U.N. are watching in horror as civilian hospitals and maternity wards are bombed. But now, it could be too late, and direct energy sanctions haven't been deployed.

Blinken's decision to "put the climate crisis at the center of our foreign policy and national security," has proven to be major and historic mistake. With one year down and two foreign policy crises already on the board, **Americans should be concerned about the diplomatic "leadership" running the State Department.**

State Department Bad – 1AR

Biden-era state department is bad

Rogin 21 [Josh Rogin, columnist for the Global Opinions section of the Washington Post and a political analyst with CNN, "Meet Biden's new foreign policy team — same as Obama's old foreign policy team," 01/05/21, *The Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/05/meet-bidens-new-foreign-policy-team-same-obamas-old-foreign-policy-team/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

The Biden team is pledging to mend alliances, re-engage international organizations and restore respect for the professional bureaucracy. This team seems well-suited for these initial tasks. But once this low-hanging fruit is picked, the mission gets harder. The famous Obama foreign policy focus on **pragmatism** and **process** seems **ill-suited** for the current grave strategic environment because **it tilts the scales of policymaking toward rumination** and **away from decisive action**.

Four years of Trump's erratic and incompetent foreign policy has left the Biden team with a steep uphill path to restoring U.S. international influence and leadership, which is urgently needed to solve urgent and complex international problems. But **competence alone is not a strategy**.

AFF – Offense

DIB DA – 2AC

Reductions in defense spending wreck the DIB

Merighi & Walton 12 [Matthew L. Merighi and Timothy A. Walton, * executive officer working in the Office of the Under-secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, "One Team, One Fight: The Need for Security Assistance Reform," 2012, *The US Army War College Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 2, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2638&context=parameters, Accessed: 05/20/22]

Ultimately, **major reductions in defense spending will lead suppliers**, as well as **research and development projects**, to **fall by the wayside**. An "American Way of War" that has utilized technology to offset quantitative advantages of our opponents may not be sustainable.2 Accordingly, with a limited defense budget, the United States needs to find new ways to simultaneously provide for national security, while maintaining its industrial base. **Improved security assistance** will be a **key pillar** of this effort. Without significant reforms that increase US responsiveness and competitiveness in the global defense market, efforts to innovate will be impacted. Fortunately, the United States can improve the existing security assistance apparatus by reforming export controls, updating legislation, expanding financing programs, and developing a dedicated security assistance workforce.

Collapses deterrence – nuclear war.

Helprin 15 [Mark Helprin, Senior Fellow of the Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy, Fellow of the American Academy in Rome, and Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, "Indefensible Defense," 06/11/15, *National Review*, https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/06/indefensible-defense/, Accessed: 05/20/22 – ability edited]

But underlying the surface chaos that dominates the news cycle are the **currents that lead to world war.** In governance by tweet, these are insufficiently addressed for being insufficiently immediate. And yet, more than anything else, how we approach the **strength of the American military**, the nuclear calculus, China, and Russia will determine the security, prosperity, honor, and at long range even the sovereignty and existence of this country.

THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

Upon our will to provide for defense, all else rests. Without it, even the most brilliant innovations and trenchant strategies will not suffice. In one form or another, the American way of war and of the deterrence of war has always been reliance on surplus. Even as we barely survived the winter of Valley Forge, we enjoyed immense and forgiving strategic depth, the 3,000-mile barrier of the Atlantic, and the great forests that would later give birth to the Navy. In the Civil War, the North's burgeoning industrial and demographic powers meshed with the infancy of America's technological ascendance to presage superiority in mass industrial — and then scientific — 20th-century warfare. The way we fight is that we do not stint. Subtract the monumental preparations, ~~cripple~~ **[debilitate] the defense industrial base, and we will fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose.**

Properly subservient, the military implements <u>the postulate of current civil authority that we cannot afford the defense we need</u>. This view, however, a commonplace of public opinion, <u>is **demonstrably false**, and insensible o</u>f a number of things, not least <u>the golden relation of economic growth and military power.</u>

DIB DA – UQ

The DIB is <u>stable</u>, but DOD is <u>key</u>.

Wirth et al. 21 [Anna Jean Wirth, Sydney Litterer, Elvira N. Loredo, Laura H. Baldwin, Ricardo Sanchez, * associate director of RAND Project AIR FORCE's Resource Management Program, and an operations researcher, "Keeping the Defense Industrial Base Afloat During COVID-19: A Review of Department of Defense and Federal Government Policies and Investments in the Defense Industrial Base," 2021, *RAND Corporation*, https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1392-1]

Taken together, these provisions of the CARES Act in support of the DIB provided cash infusion and management flexibility to support the existing supply base. This flexibility was used throughout the DIB. The Navy, for example, is largely credited with avoiding disaster in the shipbuilding industry through its acceleration of contracts (Quigley, 2021). Larger original equipment manufacturers were also reported to have supported smaller suppliers by accelerating funding. For example, Lockheed Martin reported working closely with DoD to accelerate payments to vulnerable suppliers in the amount of $1.1 billion (approximately $300 to $500 million per week) (Lockheed Martin, undated).Northrop Grumman's website also reports accelerated payments to their suppliers and the beneficial effects of this action to tier 2 and tier 3 suppliers (Northrop Grumman, undated).

Through the DPA, DoD additionally made several investments supporting the DIB through the Title III program, which "is designed to create, maintain, protect, expand, or restore domestic industrial base capabilities" (DoD, Industrial Policy, undated). These investments are summarized in Table 1. In DoD releases, they are described as actions to help retain workforce capabilities in critical elements of the DIB. For example, in June 2020, DoD announced a $20 million investment in General Electric Aviation to support the Propulsion DIB, specifically to sustain more than 100 jobs representing highly specialized engineering capabilities (DoD, 2020a). From May through September 2020, DPA Title III investments were made across several sectors of the DIB, including body armor, space, cyber, and aviation.

Retrospective analysis in 2021 reports that the DIB has largely recovered from the crisis (Mehta and Insinna, 2021). Although long-term impacts remain unclear, particularly for small businesses, and some acquisition program delays remain, industry analysts report that most elements of the DIB are solvent partly because of the $4.6 billion investment from the Pentagon from the start of the pandemic through January 2021.1

AFF – Perm

Perm – General

Permutation do both – State Department alone fails to accomplish <u>military objectives</u>.

Diaz & Sadler 21 [Janae Diaz and Brent Sadler, ** Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology, Heritage Foundation, "Don't Shift Security Cooperation To State Dept.," 06/28/21, *Breaking Defense*, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/dont-shift-security-cooperation-to-state-dept/]

America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed <u>consolidating all these programs within the State Department</u>.

That <u>would be a **big mistake**, because it would minimize the Pentagon's role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program's **military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests**, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are **not** the **values** by which such security assistance programs should be s**olely judged.**</u>

<u>Security</u> sector <u>assistance programs deliver arms, military training, and other defense-related services to allies and partner nation governments</u> via grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leasing. By definition, **these programs should prioritize national security.** To this end, <u>reforms should enhance **joint State and Defense authorities** so programs are evaluated in terms of America's national strategic goals.</u>

<u>In the existing system, State consults with Defense on</u> its <u>security assistance</u> designs. <u>Defense then implements State programs, as well as its own security cooperation programs, such as multinational military exercises and military training and advising.</u>

The departments differ in the scope to which they apply security assistance. <u>Defense programs target narrower national security objectives</u>, such as the Maritime Security Initiative, launched in 2015 to expand maritime domain awareness. <u>State's programs</u>, such as the Central America Regional Security Initiative, <u>emphasize</u> broader regional stability and <u>humanitarian goals.</u>

<u>Assistance programs can be better tailored to their objectives when State shares directive authority and decision-making power with the entity most relevant to each program's purpose</u>. For example, **when the objective is military capacity-building, the Defense Department should be an equal partner**; when the goal is justice system reform, the Department of Justice should be a full partner.

Consider how the Philippines used American-sourced coast guard cutters when responding to China's intrusions at Whitsun Reef earlier this year. Given President Biden's emphasis on strategic competition with China, strengthening partner nations to resist Beijing's maritime coercion should be a no-brainer. In this context, State should ensure it ties the objectives of its weapons sales program to Defense Department priorities, such as improving maritime domain awareness, by enabling the Philippines and, perhaps other countries, to increase patrols of exclusive economic zones.

Another report published this month by the Center for a New American Security rightly suggests that security assistance in the Middle East should be guided by strategy and applied narrowly to military effects. However, the report's recommendations are limited to counterterrorism activities and a strategy of deprioritizing the Middle East in favor of the Indo-Pacific. If limiting security assistance to military purposes would make programs more effective in a region of waning emphasis, it stands to reason that this should be the formative basis for all security assistance programs, especially when strategy calls for increased investment in the security capacities of partner nations.

Reforms to security assistance should push the agencies in this direction, encouraging — or compelling — State to design its programs **in closer coordination with the Pentagon** and **in support of Defense Department's operational needs**, such as improving military forward presence, wartime resilience and interoperability.

Congress should recognize and re-evaluate its role in these decision as well, as legislative earmarks can limit State's directive agility and responsiveness. But even the best-laid plans cannot succeed without follow-through.

The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), for example, tried to catalyze cooperation between State and Defense, but it neglected assessment processes. As a result, it fell short. This pilot program required concurrence from each department on any GSCF project and offered more flexibility in program funding. But two years after the first seven projects were announced, none had materialized. State and Defense failed to clearly define timeframes and track GSCF projects against those benchmarks, only starting to implement these standards years into the program. By 2016, execution still lagged expectations, and a frustrated Congress stopped paying for the program.

Regular evaluation that prioritizes timely, tangible measures of success directly tied to U.S. strategic interests is crucial to ensuring that programs deliver on their objectives. But as the GSCF showed, implementing assessments only after problems arise is damage control, not effective program design.

In devising reforms to ensure that U.S. funds, arms, and training are directed to viable projects that serve our national strategy, it's critical to keep the main thing the main thing. State Department priorities for security assistance should emphasize specific national security objectives that enable better Defense Department forward presence, resilience and interoperability with our security partners.

Also critical is ongoing evaluation. Assessment processes should be implemented on the front end, not as an afterthought. Reforms must be carried out with the end in mind: **security assistance for security purposes.**

Perm – Cyber

Perm do both – diplomacy fails without <u>deterrence</u>.

Sulmeyer 18 [Michael Sulmeyer, Ph.D., director, Cyber Security Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (former Director for Plans and Operations for Cyber Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense), "U.S. Cyber Diplomacy in An Era of Growing Threats," 02/06/18, *Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs No. 115-106*, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20180206/106830/HHRG-115-FA00-Transcript-20180206.pdf, Accessed: 05/19/22]

Under Chris Painter's leadership, the State Department pursued international efforts to promote norms of responsible State behavior. This effort gained momentum, especially during the latter years of the Obama administration, as did efforts to negotiate bilateral arrangements, like the U.S.-China agreement. The current administration has, thus far, for pursued more bilateral arrangements, like the one it announced with Israel last summer. Yet, my impression is that most **state behavior, not state rhetoric**, reflects a perception in international capitals that the benefits of unrestrained hacking outweigh the costs.

For the time being, the United States will likely need to focus on discrete, bilateral arrangements, while protecting U.S. interests and existing international institutions. Having a dedicated office at the State Department is crucial to pursuing both objectives. But **for diplomacy to be successful**, the United States needs to **empower its diplomats with as much leverage as possible**. One approach to creating more leverage is to **improve our ability to deter adversaries from hacking us**. In an ideal world, it would be a tremendous help if these threats could be deterred by one common approach. But the **reality is** far more **complicated**. Not all hacks are the same, so **we should not expect a one-size-fits-all model of deterrence to be successful.**

Perm – BioSecurity

Perm do both – diplomacy alone <u>fails</u> for biosecurity.

Mauroni 22 [Albert J. Mauroni, Director of the U.S. Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies at Air University, "Envisioning a New Strategy to Counter Great Power Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction," 2022, *The Counterproliferation Papers Future Warfare Series No. 62*, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/03/2002932493/-1/-1/0/62%20GREAT%20POWER%20WMD%20STRATEGY.PDF, Accessed: 05/20/22]

To be successful, the next National Strategy for <u>Countering WMD must abandon the current actor-agnostic view of past strategies, in which the policy objectives focused on generic WMD threats and not the threat sources, absent of any context.</u> Ironically, the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative was created because strategic ambiguity regarding deterrence threats were seen as insufficient against non-nuclear nations and sub-state groups. <u>Diplomacy</u> and strategic deterrence <u>worked (in theory) against nuclear-weapon states, and so there was no new or revised guidance for that context.</u> Those within the counter-WMD community understood <u>the new strategy and counterproliferation concepts were for **non-nuclear scenarios** in which U.S. forces were threatened by</u> chemical and b<u>**iological weapons**. Due to advances in technology</u>, changes in adversary concepts of engagement, and a balance of nuclear forces, <u>a **tailored approach** that **focuses on the adversary** and not a generic weapon system is required.</u>

<u>Over the past 15 years, the U.S. military competencies in countering WMD operations have degraded</u>, following the focus on Iraq's alleged WMD ambitions and the failure to find any real capability there. In no small sense, the U.S. government's approach to preparing for a domestic CBRN incident has not changed since 2002, despite the lack of any mass-casualty capability by any violent extremist group over the past 20 years. <u>Concerns about pandemic outbreaks are blurring distinctions between public health and national security interests.</u> Increasingly, <u>national security guidance is not demonstrating any awareness of the WMD threat other than to say, WMD proliferation is bad and must be addressed.</u>

As a result, <u>the</u> U.S. government in general and <u>DOD</u> in particular <u>have significant gaps in</u> our <u>strategy relating to WMD threats</u> posed by China and Russia. DOD cannot afford to develop a counter WMD strategy in isolation, as it did in 2014, without a refreshed national strategy. The 2014 DOD strategy failed to articulate specific means and ways that it would contribute toward those policy objectives. Of the promise to develop specific technical capabilities addressing WMD threats, there was no implementation plan and as a result, critical capability gaps continue to exist. <u>Given the lack of emphasis during the Trump administration, it becomes **even more vital for the Biden administration** to develop new strategic guidance that **directs the interagency** to create **specific means** and **ways** to **meet its political objectives.**</u>

PDCP – 2AC

Perm do the counterplan – security cooperation can be <u>State Department security assistance.</u>

Serafino 16 [Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs at Congressional Research Service, "Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense," 05/26/16, *Congressional Research Service*, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf, Accessed 05/20/22]

Terminology

The two terms most commonly used today for assistance to foreign military and security forces are "security assistance" and "security cooperation." Security assistance is the term most frequently used, regardless of the agency providing that assistance.

<u>There is no State Department definition for security assistance.</u> The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ), however, lists six budget accounts under the heading "International Security Assistance." These accounts, with their underlying Title 22 authorities (the 1961 FAA and the AECA), are commonly regarded as the State Department's security assistance portfolio.

<u>DOD</u> **formally defines security assistance** <u>as</u> the group of <u>State Department</u> 1961 FAA and AECA <u>programs that a DOD organization</u>, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), <u>administers</u>. These include programs conducted under two of the State Department international security assistance accounts and attendant authorities, as well as programs conducted under four related 1961 FAA and AECA authorities.

<u>DOD uses the</u> overarching <u>term</u> **"security cooperation"** to **denote** the **State Department security assistance** administered by DSCA <u>through which the U.S. government furnishes defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services,</u> **as well as all other DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments**. The purposes of the interactions with foreign defense establishments defined as security cooperation are to "build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multilateral operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation."8

PDCP – 1AR

Security assistance can include any department or agency.

Zaccor 5 [Colonel Albert Zaccor, Director for Southern Europe in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy – NATO/Europe, "Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy," 2005, *The Atlantic Council of the United States*, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005_08_Security_Cooperation_and_Non-State_Threats.pdf, Accessed 05/17/22]

In order for the USG interagency to plan and execute Security Cooperation programs and activities in an integrated and synergistic manner, a doctrine, or common conceptual framework, for Security Cooperation is necessary. Such a doctrine would have to define what Security Cooperation is, and, what it is not.117 [Begin Footnote 117] 117 As has been suggested here, <u>activities to **improve foreign partners' security capabilities** conducted by **any department or agency would qualify as Security Cooperation**</u>. In contrast, **general foreign development assistance**, <u>although related to security and part of broader U.S. foreign policy, **would**</u> probably **not**. Even within DOD, this is not totally clear. Officials in OSD's Counter-proliferation Policy office refused to admit that activities intended to improve the maritime security capabilities of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in support of counter-proliferation would be included under the definition of Security Cooperation and declined to integrate their program formally with other DOD Security Cooperation efforts. [End Footnote 117] It would have to define precisely which departmental and agency programs qualify as Security Cooperation and outline a procedure for combined interagency planning, programming, and execution. Armed with such a common conceptual framework, executive branch officials and program managers will be better equipped to engage in integrated planning and program execution. True success in this effort, however, will depend on the resolution of the other problems of authority, funding, and process and organization.

The majority of contemporary authors agree.

Fenell 11 [Nathan L. Fenell, EdD Educational Leadership and Administration, M.A. International/Global Studies, "Security Cooperation Poorly Defined," 2011, Master's Thesis, https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=thes, Accessed: 05/17/22]

<u>Contemporary authors</u> like Kapstein, and Lind, <u>who write on</u> the subject of **security cooperation** <u>consider security cooperation as a strategy or ground level tactic that takes place at the conclusion of war time hostilities but prior to the departure of United States and allied forces from foreign soil</u>.74 <u>These authors</u> also discuss the six basic activities associated with security cooperation; however they also **include** strategic and tactical **contributions** to the cooperative strategy **by the Department of State** and its subordinate and independent branches, United States Agency for International Development, United States Agricultural Department, the United States Department of Justice, and other similar organizations.75

Security assistance is a <u>subsection</u> of security cooperation..

Fenell 11 [Nathan L. Fenell, EdD Educational Leadership and Administration, M.A. International/Global Studies, "Security Cooperation Poorly Defined," 2011, Master's Thesis, https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=thes, Accessed: 05/17/22]

If I were critiquing the Bouchat article, I would report that <u>a bureaucracy has been created around the management of security cooperation activities.</u> From a strictly technical stance this criticism would be correct. The principle components of security cooperation, from a Department of Defense perspective, are, Foreign military sales (FMS); Foreign military financing (FMF); International military and education training (IMET) programs, and; Excess defense articles (EDA) transfers to define security assistance.72 <u>Figure 8</u> (below) <u>provides examples of each security cooperation activity.</u>

Typical TSC Activities

Multinational Exercises
- Field Training Exercises
- Command Post Simulations

Multinational Training
- Joint Combined Exchange Training

Multinational Education
- Regional Center for Security Studies
- Senior Service Colleges

Security Assistance
- Foreign Military Sales
- International Military Education and Training

Military-to-Military Contacts
- Senior officer visits
- Port visits
- Joint Contact Teams

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
- Mine clearing
- Excess property

Other Activities
- Exercise related construction
- Intelligence security cooperation
- Information Operations
- Command and Control programs

Figure 8. Samples of Theater Security Cooperation Activities.

The use of **<u>any one of the activities</u>** <u>would constitute a **component** of</u> a comprehensive strategy based on a policy to employ **<u>security cooperation</u>** as a method of achieving the national security goals of the United States. The point that my criticism would miss is that a whole government approach rather than a piecemeal one is required to realize an effective strategy based on security cooperation.73

PDCP – Diplomacy

Statements from DOD officials agree that security cooperation can include State Department-led diplomacy.

Cronk 21 [Terri Moon Cronk, citing Dana Stroul, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East Policy, "Defense Official Outlines U.S. Security Assistance, Cooperation in Middle East," 08/10/21, *DOD News*, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2726563/defense-official-outlines-us-security-assistance-cooperation-in-middle-east/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

The State Department's diplomacy is in the lead, she said, adding that DOD programs fall within a **whole-of-government approach** to the region.

"We utilize **security cooperation** authorities and programs to expand the capabilities of willing partners to respond to urgent security needs, and invest in the institutional growth of partner forces to share the responsibility for regional security," Stroul said.

Over time, the United States' goal is to partner with self-reliant, capable and accountable partner forces who will work alongside the nation to achieve mutual objectives based on shared threats and shared interests, she said. A long-term proposition, security cooperation programs are also designed to ensure that the United States maintains access to key areas and facilities to support the defense of its partners, respond to potential contingencies, and to protect U.S. personnel, she said.

Security cooperation comprises more than military sales and funding, Stroul noted.

PDCP – Implementation

Cooperation includes State-Planned but DOD-implemented security assistance.

Arabia 21 [Christina L. Arabia, Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade, "Defense Primer: DOD "Title 10" Security Cooperation," 05/17/21, *Congressional Research Service*, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11677.pdf, Accessed: 05/17/22]

The Department of Defense (DOD) uses the term security cooperation (SC) to refer broadly to DOD interactions with foreign security establishments. SC activities include

• the transfer of defense articles and services;

• military-to-military exercises;

• military education, training, and advising; and

• capacity building of partner security forces.

SC programs are intended to encourage and enable partner nations (PNs) to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. They are considered a key tool for achieving U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. These activities are executed through **both DOD-administered SC programs** (authorized under Title 10, U.S.C.) and **DOD-implemented State Department (DOS) security assistance (SA) programs** (authorized under Title 22, U.S.C). Beyond grant-based programs, SC encompasses the Foreign Military Sales program and enables U.S. and PN collaboration on defense articles. The following sections focus on DOD "Title 10" activities.

AFF – INB

AT: Generic Diplomacy

Diplomacy fails <u>without hard power</u>.

Nossel 22 [Suzanne Nossel, CEO of PEN America and a member of Facebook's oversight board; formerly deputy assistant secretary of state for international organizations at the U.S. State Department, "When Diplomacy Fails," 02/28/22, *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/28/russia-ukraine-biden-eu-when-diplomacy-fails/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

A deep antipathy to armed conflict is no doubt a good thing. But in saying on the eve of Russia's incursion that "there is no alternative to diplomacy," U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres spoke rhetorically. <u>Those</u> who are <u>determined to avert war **don't always get to decide whether war will happen.**</u> That prerogative rests with those who are eager, or even reluctantly <u>willing, to risk military conflagration.</u>

<u>A</u> government's <u>steadfast refusal to go to war doesn't mean</u> that <u>war won't ensue. Calm talk and delaying tactics</u> may sometimes dissuade a violent intruder, but they <u>don't always work.</u> While **diplomacy and** the use of **force** are sometimes <u>juxtaposed as binary alternatives in the news media, they</u> **are** often **intertwined**. **The threat of force can catalyze compromise.** Failed diplomacy can devolve into war. Once war begins, diplomacy doesn't end but often escalates, with a focus on containing conflict, curbing civilian casualties, and achieving a cease-fire.

Diplomats sometimes use the metaphor of a toolbox. As Putin's troops encircled Ukraine, the Biden administration tried just about every hammer, vise, and scalpel within reach. It pursued high-level direct engagement between Biden and Putin; face-to-face negotiations with the Russians at varied levels and venues; written exchanges; packages of incentives; multilateral talks through the U.N. Security Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; an effort to resurrect four-party talks under the so-called Normandy Format; and diplomatic gambits by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

The Biden administration spelled out the consequences of a Russian invasion explicitly in terms of punishing financial sanctions while leaving to the imagination what Biden called "swift and severe" reprisals that go well beyond that. U.S. officials worked assiduously to forge unity among Western nations, creating a remarkably united front. They made incisive use of intelligence, exposing Russia's alleged schemes to manufacture Ukrainian provocations as justification for attack and to install a pro-Kremlin Russian leader.

Normally low-key U.S. diplomats have summoned dramatic flair, with Secretary of State Antony Blinken making a last-ditch speech to the U.N. Security Council laying out Putin's purported plans in minute, riveting detail. During a Security Council meeting late last week the Indian delegation cynically abstained from a resolution deploring Russia's incursion saying, "it is a matter of regret that the path of diplomacy was given up." But, of course, the only party to give up on diplomacy was Putin himself when he ordered troops to cross the border. A majority of the Council understood that well, forcing Russia to exercise its veto in order to escape condemnation.

Timed just months after America's agonizing withdrawal from Afghanistan, Putin's march on Ukraine seemed premised on the conviction that neither Washington nor Western Europe would have the stomach to intervene militarily to defend Moscow's onetime client state. Back in December, Biden announced unequivocally that troop deployments to Ukraine were off the table.

Yet the United States continues to bulk up its military presence in Poland, Romania, and Germany, acknowledging that war isn't always easily contained. The administration has repeatedly now avowed that should Putin enter NATO territory, he will meet with the full military force of the alliance.

The Biden team rightly learned the lesson of former President Barack Obama's breached red line over chemical weapons use in Syria that <u>once an explicit threat of force is made, failure to follow through **invites adversaries** ready to push</u> and provoke <u>without fear of consequences.</u> Whether greater ambiguity on the West's part about the possibility of allied intervention to defend Ukraine's borders might have deterred Putin's designs—and perhaps pried open a diplomatic solution—is unknowable.

<u>War</u> has <u>erupted in Ukraine</u> not because diplomacy wasn't tried but <u>because diplomacy couldn't deter a leader such as Putin, who saw advantage in an all-out invasion and is willing to tolerate the fallout.</u> Signs that Putin is becoming unhinged and distanced from even his closest advisors underscore a risk that has loomed all along: that the Russian leader is beyond appeals to reason or logic. Nonetheless, the Biden administration and its allies now hold the moral high ground of having exhausted preventive efforts, short of preemptively trading away Ukrainian sovereignty.

AT: Democracy – IL

Security assistance <u>backfires</u>.

Sullivan 21 [Patricia Lynne Sullivan, associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Does Security Assistance Work? Why It May Not Be the Answer for Fragile States," 11/15/21, *Modern War Institute*, https://mwi.usma.edu/does-security-assistance-work-why-it-may-not-be-the-answer-for-fragile-states/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

<u>Foreign military aid can</u> unintentionally **tip** a post-conflict regime's **cost-benefit calculus away from** a **good governance** strategy <u>in favor of</u> a **restricting** and **repressing** strategy by **lowering the costs**, and **increasing the expected benefits, of repression.**

Like other types of foreign aid, <u>military aid can **shield political leaders from the consequences of governing poorly.** Governments that rely on taxing domestic production to raise revenue have greater incentives to provide the public goods and services, including citizen security, that enable economic growth.</u> And dependence on taxing citizens forces governments to prioritize the population's perceptions of the government's legitimacy. <u>If the government can fund and equip state security forces with external resources, making it less dependent on taxation, **citizens have less leverage** to demand government accountability.</u> Moreover, unlike development or humanitarian aid, <u>military aid and arms transfers directly increase the capacity of state security forces to defend the regime against domestic threats to their survival—removing another means by which the public could hold the regime accountable.</u>

In addition to lowering the costs and increasing the regime's capacity for repression, <u>foreign military aid can **entrench interests hostile to political liberalization** in recipient countries. Leaders can use foreign military aid and weapons transfers to **buy the allegiance of a military elite**, ensuring their loyalty in the face of challenges from the wider citizenry. Aid thus reinforces the privileged position of the military, empowering it relative to other state institutions and giving it an incentive to work with the ruling regime to repress liberalization efforts that would redistribute power and resources away from the military. In Uganda</u>, for instance, <u>$2 billion a year in economic and military aid from the United States</u> and other Western donors has <u>enabled President Yoweri Museveni to buy the loyalty of military generals with big budgets and high-tech military equipment. In return, the country's security forces help the leader intimidate his political opposition with tactics including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and torture.</u>

Conditioning doesn't solve – <u>circumvented</u> and <u>other aid</u>.

Darden 19 [Jessica Trisko Darden, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at the School of International Service at American University, "Aiding and Abetting: U.S. Foreign Assistance and State Violence," 2019, Stanford University Press, pp. 112-113]

<u>Recognizing the link between U.S. military assistance and repressive behavior by foreign governments, Congress **decided to make military assistance conditional** on a military's human rights behavior. Specific units that violate human rights can be excluded from future foreign</u>

assistance, but other parts of that same military may continue to receive support. This has proven to be an **imperfect solution** to a **difficult problem**. Although there are many reasons why the collective punishment of a military for one unit's abuses is not a practical way to resolve human rights concerns, the effectiveness of any restrictions on military assistance is limited by the ability of aid recipients to divert other forms of aid toward military spending. As a result, human rights conditionality **has not created** the expected **incentives for improved human rights behavior. Nor has the actual cutoff of aid been an effective tool for punishing repressive regimes**. Time and again, congressionally mandated foreign aid cuts or restrictions are either **circumvented by the executive branch through presidential waivers** or **undermined by the continued provision of other forms of foreign aid**, such as economic assistance. Other reasons for continuing foreign assistance—be they U.S. national security interests or supposed economic need—take precedence over human rights.

AT: Democracy!

Democracy is <u>resilient</u> but <u>fails</u>

Doorenspleet 19 [Renske Doorenspleet, Politics Professor at the University of Warwick, "Rethinking the Value of Democracy," 2019, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 239-243]

Key Findings: Rethinking the Value of Democracy

<u>The value of democracy has been **taken for granted**</u> until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy's claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). <u>This study was based on a search of **an enormous academic database**</u> for certain keywords,6 <u>then pruned **the thousands of articles**</u> down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) <u>which **statistically analysed** the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes</u>.

The first finding is that **a reverse wave away from democracy** has **not happened** (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. <u>Democracy is not doing worse than before</u>, at least not <u>in comparative perspective</u>. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 <u>a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected</u>. It would be better to talk about 'stagnation', as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed.

Another finding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The field has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. <u>There has been **'no consensus'** in **the quantitative literature** on whether democracy has</u> instrumental value which leads some **beneficial general outcomes**. <u>Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring **a huge amount of literature** which rejects their own point of view</u>. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), <u>this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefits are **not** as **strong**</u> as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena.

The overall evidence is **weak**. Take the expected impact of democracy on peace for example. As Chapter 3 showed, the study of democracy and interstate war has been a flourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace between countries, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. **Most statistical studies** have not found **a strong correlation** <u>between democracy and **interstate war** at **the dyadic level**</u>. They show that <u>there are other—**more powerful**—explanations for war</u> and peace, and even that <u>the impact of democracy is **a spurious one**</u> (caveat 1). Moreover, <u>the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is **weak**</u>, and <u>the causal mechanisms are **unclear**</u> (caveat 2). In addition, <u>democracies are not</u> necessarily **more peaceful in general**, and <u>the evidence</u> for the democratic peace

hypothesis at **the monadic level** is **inconclusive** (caveat 3). Finally, the process of democratization is **dangerous**. Living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country (caveat 4). With regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value.

Can the (instrumental) value of democracy be found in the prevention of civil war? Or is the evidence for the opposite idea more convincing, and does democracy have a 'dark side' which makes civil war more likely? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war (prevalence, onset, duration and severity) are mixed up in some civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is incredibly difficult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses (caveat 1). Moreover, there is **no linear link**: civil wars are **just as unlikely** in democracies as in dictatorships (caveat 2). Civil war is most likely in times of political change. Democratization is **a very unpredictable**, **dangerous process**, increasing the chance of civil war significantly. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is much higher compared to other political systems (caveat 3). More specifically, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. However, the type of political system (e.g. democracy or dictatorship) is **not the decisive factor at all** (caveat 4). Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power (caveat 5). Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. Helping countries to democratize would **even be a very dangerous idea**, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely. It is true that there is evidence that the chance of civil war decreases when the extent of democracy increases considerably. The problem however is that most countries do not go through big political changes but through small changes instead; those small steps—away or towards more democracy—are dangerous. Not only is the onset of civil war likely under such circumstances, but civil wars also tend to be longer, and the conflict is more cruel leading to more victims, destruction and killings (see Chapter 4).

A more encouraging story can be told around the value for democracy to control corruption in a country (see Chapter 5). Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fighting against high levels of continuous corruption. So far, the statistical evidence has strongly supported this idea. As Chapter 5 showed, dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research have found statistically significant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization (caveat 1) and measurement (caveat 2) of 'corruption'. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are **the poorest performers** with regard to controlling corruption (caveat 3). Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country (caveat 4). In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time, there is clear

evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power (caveat 5). In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats).

The perceived impact of democracy on development has been highly contested as well (see Chapter 6). Some scholars argue that democratic systems have a positive impact, while others argue that high levels of democracy actually reduce the levels of economic growth and development. Particularly since the 1990s, statistical studies have focused on this debate, and the empirical evidence is **clear**: there is **no direct impact** of democracy on development. Hence, both approaches cannot be supported (see caveat 1). The indirect impact via other factors is also questionable (caveat 2). Moreover, there is **too much variation** in levels of economic growth and development among the dictatorial systems, and there are huge regional differences (caveat 3). Adopting a one-size-fits-all approach would not be wise at all. In addition, in order to increase development, it would be better to focus on alternative factors such as improving institutional quality and good governance (caveat 4). There is not sufficient evidence to state that democracy has instrumental value, at least not with regard to economic growth. However, future research needs to include broader concepts and measurements of development in their models, as so far studies have mainly focused on explaining cross-national differences in growth of GDP (caveat 5).

Overall, **the instrumental value of democracy** is—at best—tentative, or—if being less mild—**simply non-existent**. Democracy is **not necessarily better** than **any alternative form of government**. With regard to many of the expected benefits—such as less war, less corruption and more economic development—democracy **does deliver, but so do nondemocratic systems**. High or low levels of democracy do not make a distinctive difference. Mid-range democracy levels do matter though. Hybrid systems can be associated with many negative outcomes, while this is also the case for democratizing countries. Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefits, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8

AT: Miscalc !

Miscalculation is <u>theoretically</u> and <u>empirically</u> denied – Cuban Missile Crisis proves.

Mueller 21 [John Mueller, Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, and adjunct professor of political science at The Ohio State University, "The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency," 2021, Cambridge University Press]

<u>There were</u> also <u>concerns</u> at the time that the two <u>contestants might</u> somehow <u>get into</u> a <u>war by accident</u>. However, <u>the **historical record** suggests</u> that **wars simply do not begin that way.** <u>In his extensive survey of wars that</u> have <u>occurred since 1400, Luard concludes, "It is impossible to identify a **single case** in which</u> it can be said that a <u>war started accidentally; in which it was not</u>, at the time the war broke out, <u>the deliberate intention of at least one party</u> that <u>war should take place</u>." Geoffrey Blainey, after similar study, very much agrees: <u>although many</u> have <u>discussed</u> "accidental" or "unintentional" wars, "**it is difficult**," he concludes, "**to find a war which on investigation fits this description**." Or, as Henry Kissinger has put it dryly, "<u>Despite popular myths</u>, **large military units do not fight by accident**." And, <u>after investigating 40 crises with some</u> sort of <u>nuclear connection</u>, analyst Bruno Tertrais concludes, "**solid command and control arrangements, sound procedures, constant vigilance, efficient training**, and **cool-headedness of leadership** have <u>ensured</u> – and can continue to ensure – that **nuclear weapons** will continue to **play only a deterrence role**." And then adds: "**'Luck' has very little to do with it.**" 70

<u>Even if an accident takes place during a crisis</u>, **it does not follow that escalation** or hasty response **is inevitable**, or even very <u>likely</u>. As Brodie points out, <u>escalation scenarios essentially impute to both sides</u> "a well-**nigh limitless concern with saving face**" <u>and</u>/or "**a great deal of** ground-in **automaticity of response and counterresponse**." 71 <u>None of this was in evidence during the **Cuban missile crisis** when there were **accidents galore**. An American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba</u>, probably <u>without authorization,</u> <u>and another accidentally went off course and flew threateningly over the Soviet Union</u>. <u>These events were duly evaluated and then ignored</u>. Actually, <u>the Americans had specifically decided</u> that <u>if a U-2 plane were shot down over Cuba, they would retaliate by destroying the antiaircraft site responsible</u>.72 <u>When the event came to pass, however,</u> **the policy was simply not carried out.**73